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"Few historians, however, hold themselves out as fictionists." 
Jerome Frank, The Place of the Expert in a Democratic Society1 
True, no man can be wholly apart from his fellows. But, if each of us is a 
promontory, yet the promontory reaches out beyond the social mainland to a 
point where others cannot intrude. . . . It is a no-other-man's land, for others 
can't penetrate it, can't communicate with it. 
Jerome Frank, Judge Learned Hancf 
INTRODUCTION 
On my summer vacation, I chanced upon the novel Foe by the South African writer 
J.M. Coetzee.3 Foe is a modem reworking of Daniel Defoe's Robinson Crusoe. In this 
modem retelling, Coetzee presents the story of the relation of author and subject, not the 
story of the adventures of a shipwrecked Englishman. In Foe, the authorial voice is that 
of Susan Barton, a castaway who ended up on the same island as Cruso and Friday. She, 
Cruso and Friday are "rescued" and taken by ship to England. En route, Cruso dies. 
Once in London, Susan Barton takes her story of Cruso and Friday to Daniel Foe, and 
finds that his interest is more in the -story of her life and less in the story of Cruso' s 
adventures. Foe, chased by creditors, flees his house, into which Barton and Friday move. 
Barton later leaves, searching for Foe, whom she finally tracks down. Confronting Foe, 
she says, "I am not a story, Mr. Foe."4 Then, after embracing a young woman who also 
calls herself Susan Barton and claims to be her daughter, a claim denied by our narrator, 
she continues: 
In the beginning I thought I would tell you the story of the island and, being 
done with that, return to my former life. But now all my life grows to be story 
and there is nothing of my own left to me. I thought I was myself and this girl 
a creature from another order speaking words you made up for her. But now I 
am full of doubt. Nothing is left to me but doubt. I am doubt itself. Who is 
speaking me? Am I a phantom too? To what order do I belong? And you: who 
are you?5 
* Professor, St. Mary's University School of Law, San Antonio, Texas. Permission to quote from 
the Edmund M. Morgan Papers at the Harvard Law School Library was kindly given by Harvard Law School 
Archivist David de Lorenzo, whose assistance on this and other projects is here gratefully acknowledged. 
1. Jerome Frank, The Place of the Expert in a Democratic Society, reprinted in A MAN'S REACH: THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF JUDGE JEROME FRANK 31 (Barbara Frank Kristein ed., 1965). 
2. Jerome Frank, Judge Learned Hand, reprinted in A MAN'S REACH: THE PHILOSOPHY OF JUDGE 
JEROME FRANK 49 (Barbara Frank Kristein ed., 1965). 
3. J.M. COETZEE, FOE (1987). 
4. !d. at 131. 
5. !d. at 133. 
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My story is about the history of hearsay (and, more broadly, evidentiary) reform. My 
story more particularly is about a case involving two major figures in American law. For 
evidence scholars, the case of Palmer v. Hoffman6 represents one of a few cases 
concerning hearsay known by name.7 The two major figures are Jerome N. Frank and 
Edmund M. Morgan, Jr., whose stories I have both appropriated, and, I hope, treated with 
honor and respect. 
Jerome Frank remains well known in legal academia as a symbol of American legal 
realism during the interwar years. His 1930 book, Law and the Modern Mind, 8 became 
one of the foremost works of legal realism. Frank's work and influence in American law 
and legal thought has been the subject of several books,9 and his influence on American 
legal thought is a prominent feature of recent works on the history of American law. 10 In 
contrast, although Morgan was an important figure in the history of legal reform and the 
professionalization of legal education, he is remembered today only by evidence and 
procedure scholars. 11 Even here, his influence has been undervalued. 12 
6. 318 U.S. 109 (1943), affg Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1942). Because the plaintiff 
Hoffman was successful in the Second Circuit, the defendant Palmer, a trustee of the railroad, was the petitioner 
before the Supreme Court and thus the first named party. My interest, however, is in the Second Circuit 
decision, not the decision ofthe Supreme Court. 
7. Others include the English case of Wright v. Doe d. Tatham, 7 Ad. & E. 313, 112 Eng. Rep. 488 
(1837) (defining hearsay in broad tenns, thus extending the reach of the rule); Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 
96 (1933) (holding inadmissible as a dying declaration a statement by defendant's deceased wife shortly before 
she died that "Dr. Shepard has poisoned me."); Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913) (holding 
inadmissible to prove defendant's innocence to murder charge a confession by another, deceased at the time of 
trial); and Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285 (1892) (holding admissible as exception to hearsay rule 
letter written by Adolph Walters concerning his future travel plans with plaintiffs allegedly deceased husband 
to show Walters, and not plaintiffs husband, was the decedent). 
8. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930). This book went through 6 printings by 1948, 
and in 1985 was reprinted in the Legal Classics series. 
9. JULIUS PAUL, THE LEGAL REALISM OF JEROME N. FRANK ( 1959); 1. MITCHELL ROSENBERG, JEROME 
FRANK: JURIST AND PHILOSOPHER ( 1970); WALTER E. VOLKOMER, THE PASSIONATE LIBERAL: THE POLITICAL 
AND LEGAL IDEAS OF JEROME FRANK (1970); 'ROBERT JEROME GLENNON, THE ICONOCLAST AS REFORMER: 
JEROME FRANK'S IMPACT ON AMERICAN LAW (1985). Interestingly, none of these works is a biography. 
' Although the milestones of Frank's life are briefly noted, it is Frank's work that is analyzed, not his life. This 
is somewhat surprising given Frank's view ofthe importance of understanding a judge's personality in order 
to understand the legal process. A collection of Frank's writings is A MAN'S REACH: THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
JUDGE JEROME FRANK (Barbara Frank Kristein ed., 1965). A bibliography of articles about and memorial 
tributes to Jerome Frank is found in MARVIN SCHICK, LEARNED HAND'S COURT 362-63 (1970). See also J. 
Mitchell Rosenberg, Frank, Jerome, in DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 1956-60, at 215 (John A. Garraty 
ed., Supp. VI 1980). 
10. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 482-91 (1993); MORTON 
1. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1870-1960 at 175-79 (1992). See generally KERMIT 
L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 270-71 ( 1989); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A 
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 688, 692 (2d ed. 1985). See also Neil Duxbury, Jerome Frank and the Legacy of 
Realism, 18 J.L. & Soc'Y 175 (1991). 
11. One example of the fact t})at Morgan is undeservedly forgotten is the absence of an entry on Morgan 
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The issue in the case of Hoffman v. Palmer was relatively simple: In a case involving 
a collision between a car a~d a train, was the defendant railroad permitted to introduce 
into evidence the transcript of a question and answer session made two days after the 
accident between the engineer of the train and another employee of the railroad? If 
believed, this statement exonerated the railroad from liability. Although a federal statute 13 
enacted in 1936 appeared to permit (and maybe even require) the trial court to admit the 
statement, the court excluded the statement. On appeal, writing for a divided court, Judge 
Jerome Frank held that the statute implicitly required the absence of a motive to lie on the 
part of the declarant (the railroad engineer who gave the statement) in order for the 
statement to be admissible. His opinion was unanimously affirmed by the Supreme Court 
in an opinion written by Justice William 0. Douglas. 14 Morgan vehemently disagreed 
with both Frank and Douglas's opinions. Hoffman v. Palmer is emblematic of the history 
of the American law of evidence, of law reform, and, because of the people involved, of 
the history of twentieth century American legal thought. 
I. THE IDEA OF HEARSAY REFORM 
Much of the history of the American law of evidence, including its most contentious 
(and difficult) issue, hearsay, is the story of stasis and reform. In 1810, the first compiler 
of the American law of evidence, Zephaniah Swift, wrote: 
For a long time, the rules of evidence were uncertain, and contradictory, and in 
some instances, were not adapted to the discovery of truth. But, by a course of 
modem decisions, founded on the most liberal principles of policy, they are 
reduced to a precision, and certainty, susceptible of little further improvement, 
in the Dictionary of American Biography. A second example is the absence of Morgan's name from any of the 
four books cited in supra note 10. 
12. I have written a history ofthe codification of the American Jaw of evidence in which Morgan plays 
a centra] role. Michael Ariens, Progress Is Our Only Product: Legal Reform and the Codification of Evidence, 
17 LAw & Soc INQ. 213 ( 1992). Although I am indebted to his excenent work, I am convinced that a prominent 
historian of evidence, WiJliam Twining, has marginalized Morgan's role in his study of the "Anglo-American" 
history of evidence. See generally WILLIAM TWINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND WIGMORE 
(1985). 
13. 28 U.S.C. § 695 (1936): 
Admissibility. In any court of the United States and in any court established by Act of Congress, 
any writing or record, whether in the form of an entry in a book or otherwise, made as a 
memorandum or record of any act, transaction, occurrence, or event, shan be admissible as 
evidence of said act, transaction, occurrence, or event, if it shan appear that it was made in the 
regular course of any business, and that it was the regular course of such business to make such 
memorandum or record at the time of such act, transaction, occurrence, or event or within a 
reasonable time thereafter. All other circumstances of the making of such writing or record, 
incJuding lack of persona] knowledge by the entrant or maker, may be shown to affect its weight, 
but they shaH not affect its admissibility. The term "business" sha]] incJude business, profession, 
occupation, and caning of every kind. 
14. 318 u.s. 109 (1943). 
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and may now be considered as placed on a basis, that will endure as long as truth 
and justice shall be revered. 15 
Thirty years later, Harvard Law School Professor Simon Greenleaf'6 published the 
first volume of his three-volume Treatise on the Law of Evidence. At the close of this 
volume, Greenleaf wrote: 
The student will not fail to observe the symmetry and beauty of this branch 
of the law, under whatever disadvantages it may labor from the manner of 
treatment; and will rise from the study of its principles, convinced, with Lord 
Erskine, that "they are founded in the charities of religion-in the philosophy of 
nature-in the truths of history-and in the experience of common life. " 17 
Of this first major American evidence treatise, Charles Sumner wrote, "[Greenleafs] aim 
has been to expound the law as it is, and not to enter into the entangled discussion of the 
various questions of its reform." 18 One area in which "the law as it is" was not to be 
disturbed was hearsay. In Greenleafs view, "considerations of public interest and 
convenience" "are considerations of too grave a character to be overlooked by the court 
or the legislature" to change the rule. 19 Possibly because this work attempted merely to 
"expound the law as it is," Greenleafs Treatise was enormously successful, going through 
sixteen editions, the last published in 1899 under the partial editorship of John Henry 
Wigmore. 
The most prominent proponent of evidentiary reform during the antebellum era was 
John Appleton,20 later a Supreme Court justice in the state of Maine. Appleton's essays, 
most of which were written in the 1830s, roundly criticized the rules of evidence for 
hampering the search for the truth. When Appleton's articles were collected and printed 
in book form in 1860,21 he claimed in the Preface that rules of evidence designed to 
protect themselves by "knaves and criminals great and small" could not "have materially 
improved upon the existent law. "22 Among the rules of greatest concern to Appleton were 
15. ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES x ( 1810 
Amo repr. 1972). 
16. On Greenleaf, see H.W. Howard Knott, Greenleaf, Simon, in 7 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN 
BIOGRAPHY 583 (Allen Johnson & Dumas Malone eds., 1931 ); Charles Warren, 1 HISTORY OF THE HARVARD 
LAW SCHOOL AND OF EARLY LEGAL CONDITIONS IN AMERICA 480-543 (1908); 2 id. at 1-46; THE CENTENNIAL 
HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, 1817-1917 at 215-19 (1918). Professor Alfred Konefsky is writing 
a biography of Greenleaf. 
17. SIMON GREENLEAF, 1 A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE§ 584 (1842) (footnote omitted). 
18. Charles Sumner, Greenleaf on Evidence, 27 AM. JURIST & L. MAG. 379, 388 (July 1842). 
19. GREENLEAF, supra note 17, at§ 124. 
20. On Appleton, see DAVID M. GOLD, THE SHAPING OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY LAW: JOHN APPLETON 
AND RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUALISM ( 1990), a study of Appleton's work. A fond personal reminiscence by 
Charles Hamlin is found in John Appleton, 5 GREAT AMERICAN LA WYERS 41 (William Draper Lewis ed., 1908). 
See also Robert Hale, Appleton, John, in 1 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 328 (Allen Johnson ed., 
1928). 
21. JOHN APPLETON, THE RULES OF EVIDENCE STATED AND DISCUSSED (1860). 
22. !d. at 9-10. 
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the rules excluding as incompetent witnesses interested parties and atheists. 23 Also of 
concern were the rules protecting privileged communications. 24 Appleton later turned to 
the rules regulating hearsay.25 In an article titled Hearsay Evidence, Appleton made a 
case for the admission of hearsay evidence if the declarant was dead. 26 Although hearsay 
is "an inferior species of evidence," "when the witness is dead, his declarations in 
whatsoever form attainable should be received. "27 After Appleton's essays were reprinted 
in book form, two of the handful of reviews, while praising the work, deemed some of 
Appleton's proposed reforms "radical."28 
Both Appleton and defenders of the rules of evidence in nineteenth century America 
believed the goal of the rules was to produce the truth. At his retirement dinner in 1883, 
Appleton stated his view of the role of the judge: 
He should seek for the truth. He should present facts as they exist. . . . [H]e 
would be derelict of his duty if he omitted to clearly state to them the evidence 
and its bearings on the rights of parties--thus aiding the jury in arriving at the 
truth. One side of every litigation is in the right and the other in the wrong. 29 
Whether one accepted or disparaged the current state of the law of evidence, the rules of 
evidence were based on the premise that the trier of fact (usu~lly a jury) was to hear 
evidence which allowed it to determine what really happened. 
In 1898, Harvard Law School Professor James Bradley Thayer's book, A Preliminary 
Treatise on the Law of Evidence, was published. In his Treatise, Thayer preached that 
because of the manner in which the rules of evidence were created and developed, "there 
has resulted plenty of confusion."30 The "greatest obstacle to be overcome"31 in the 
23. John Appleton, Incompetency of Parties as Witnesses at Common Law, 8 AM. JURIST & L. MAG. 
5 (July 1832); John Appleton, Incompetency of Witnesses from Interest, 6 AM. JURIST & L. MAG. 18 (July 1831 ); 
John Appleton, Incompetency of Witnesses from Infamy of Character, 5 AM. JURIST & L. MAG. I 0 I (Jan. 1831 ); 
John Appleton, Of Incompetency of Witnesses on account of Religious Opinion, 4 AM. JURIST & L. MAG. 286 
(Oct. 1830). 
- 24. John Appleton, Attorney and Client, 17 AM. JURIST & L. MAG. 304 (July 1837); John Appleton, 
The Admission of Husband and Wife, 15 AM. JURIST & L. MAG. 274 (July 1836). 
25. John Appleton, Hearsay Evidence and Confessions or Admissions of the Party, 20 AM. JURIST & 
L. MAG. 68 (Oct. 1838); John Appleton, Hearsay Evidence, 24 AM. JURIST & L. MAG. 118 (Oct. 1840) 
[hereinafter "Hearsay Evidence"]. 
26. Hearsay Evidence, supra note 25. 
27. Hearsay Evidence, supra note 25, at 120-21. 
28. Review of Current Literature, 70 CHRISTIAN EXAM. 150, 151-52 (Jan. 1861) ("Judge Appleton rests 
his argument on the very startling and radical proposition-which the reader will find assumed on every 
page-that the object of evidence is to get at facts .... "); 24 MONTHLY L. RPTR. 450 (May 1862) ("While there 
are now, probably, few persons who would assent to all of his conclusions-some of which are, in a legal sense, 
extremely radical .... "). 
29. Hamlin, supra note 20, at 77 (quoting retirement speech of Chief Justice John Appleton). 
30. JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 4 (1898). On 
Thayer, see Samuel Williston, Thayer, James Bradley, in 18 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 405 
(Dumas Malone ed., 1936); James Parker Hall, James Bradley Thayer, in 8 GREAT AMERICAN LA WYERS 343 
(William Draper Lewis ed., 1909); James Bradley Thayer, 15 HARV. L. REV. 599 (1902). See also Jay Hook, 
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reform ofthe law of evidence were lawyers. However, by emulating the statutory reform 
of civil procedure in Massachusetts, legislative reform of the law of evidence was 
possible. 32 If the law of evidence were to be reformed, the result should be that "[ w ]e 
should have a system of evidence simple, aiming straight at the substance of justice, not 
nice or refined in its details, not too rigid, easily grasped and easily applied. "33 
Thayer briefly considered the problem of hearsay in the final chapter of the Treatise. 
For Thayer, "[a] true analysis would probably restate the law so as to make what we call 
the hearsay rule the exception, and make our main rule this, namely, that whatsoever is 
relevant is admissible."34 In 1898, the Massachusetts legislature, at Thayer's behest, 
passed an act barring hearsay objections to declarations made by a "deceased person" "if 
it appears to the satisfaction of the judge to have been made in good faith before the 
beginning of the suit and upon the personal knowledge of the declarant."35 
Then, in 1904-05, Thayer's former student and friend, John Henry Wigmore, 
published his four-volume Treatise on Evidence.36 Wigmore's work was one of 
conservative reform. "That our law of Evidence can be improved upon, no one doubts. 
That the improvement must be gradual, yet unremitting, is equally certain .... "37 Like 
A Brief Life of James Bradley Thayer, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. I (1993). Hook is currently working on a biography 
of Thayer. 
31. THAYER, supra note 30, at 532. 
32. THAYER, supra note 30, at 532-533. Thayer approvingly judged this reform as "a careful but radical 
change." THAYER, supra note 30, at 533. 
33. THAYER, supra note 30, at 529. 
34. THAYER, supra note 30, at 522. 
35. 1898 Mass. Acts ch. 535: 
No declaration of a deceased person shall be excluded as evidence on the ground of its being 
hearsay if it apears to the satisfaction of the judge to have been made in good faith before the 
beginning of the suit and upon the personal knowledge of the declarant. 
This act was later amended to read: 
A declaration of a deceased person shall not be inadmissible in evidence as hearsay if the 
court finds that it was made in good faith before the commencement of the action and upon the 
personal knowledge of the declarant. 
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 233, § 65 (Mass Ter. ed. 1932). 
John Appleton suggested a similar revision ofthe rule against hearsay in his 1840 article. See Hearsay 
Evidence, supra note 25, at 120-21. 
36. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 
{ 4 vols. 1904-05) [hereinafter TREATISE 1]. On Wigmore, see WILLIAM R. ROALFE, JOHN HENRY WIGMORE: 
SCHOLAR AND REFORMER {1977); Stephen Botein, Wigmore, John Henry, in DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN 
BIOGRAPHY 1941-45 at 820 (Edward T. James ed., Supp. Ill 1973); John Henry Wigmore, 38 ILL. L. REV. 1 
(1943); John Henry Wigmore: A Centennial Tribute, 58 Nw. U. L. REV. 443 (1963). 
3 7. 1 TREATISE, supra note 36 at xii. See also JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM 
OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW at § 8c {2d ed. 1923) [hereinafter TREATISE II]. ("Our system of 
evidence is sound on the whole."). Wigmore seemed pained by the accusation that "the rules of Evidence, over 
and above all others have come to bear, even within the profession itself, the stigma of technical arbitrariness 
and obstructive unreason." TREATISE I, supra note 36, at vii-viii. For Wigmore, this was not true: "The rules 
of Evidence, as recorded in our law, may be said to be essentially rational." TREATISE I, supra note 36, at viii. 
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Appleton's earlier effort for evidentiary reform, Wigmore's Treatise focused on the 
relation between the rules of evidence and the search for the truth. "What the law of 
Evidence, and of Procedure, nowadays most needs is that the men who are our judges and 
our lawyers shall firmly dispose themselves to get at the truth and the merits of the case 
before them."38 Unlike Appleton, Wigmore noted that this relation was hampered by the 
professional inclination to appeal evidentiary issues rulings on evidence. "The partisan 
spirit of the bar, contesting desperately on each trifle, and the unjust doctrine of new trials, 
tempting counsel to push up to the appellate courts upon every ruling of evidence, 
increased this tendency."39 By 1908, however, Wigmore had concluded that only the 
opinion rule, which barred witnesses other than experts from testifying to "opinions" 
instead of "facts," was "radically discreditable."40 
For evidence progressives like Thayer and Wigmore, the prospect of reform faced 
several hurdles. Although the era of the great court lawyer as symbol of the lawyer as 
professional was coming to a close by the beginning of the twentieth century, the era's 
ethos of the sporting theory of justice predominated.41 Progressives also believed reform 
efforts were blocked by incompetent and often corrupt state legislatures and local trial 
judges. 
Until his death in 1943, Wigmore was the brooding omnipresence of the law of 
evidence. Any effort to reform the law of evidence needed to pass Wigmore's muster if 
it were to have any chance of judicial or legislative acceptance. Even with his blessing, 
prospects for reforming the law of evidence were severely limited by professional inertia 
and complacence. 
The first major effort to reform the law of evidence began in 1920. A Legal Research 
Committee sponsored by the Commonwealth Fund appointed a Committee to Propose 
Specific Reforms in the Law of Evidence. The chairman of the Evidence Committee was 
Edmund M. Morgan, then a professor at Yale Law School. The report was finally 
published in 1927, and did not propose a model code of evidence, because, according to 
the Committee, "[ o ]ur system of evidence is sound on the whole. "42 .Instead, the 
· 38. WIGMORE, CODE OF EVIDENCE at xiii (2d ed. I935). 
39. I TREATISE I, supra note 36, at§ 8. Wigmore was echoing a comment made by Thayer in his 
Treatise: "In our own administration of the law of evidence too many abuses are allowed, and the power of the 
courts is far too little exercised in contro11ing the eager lawyer in his endeavors to press to an extreme the 
application of the rules." The result was that the American judicial process tended "thus to foster delay and 
chicane." THAYER, supra note 30 at 528-29. Two years after Wigmore's book was published, Roscoe Pound, 
then Dean at the University of Nebraska Law School, excoriated the profession at the annual meeting of the 
American Bar Association for its attachment to the "sporting theory of justice." Roscoe Pound, The Causes of 
Popular Dissatisfaction in the Administration of Justice, 29 A.B.A. REP. 395, 405 (1906), and cited Wigmore 
for the proposition that this view inaccurately depicted the adversary system. The next year Wigmore hired 
Pound to teach at Northwestern. He also returned the favor, approvingly citing Pound's speech as "diagnosing~' 
the causes of the defects of American procedural law, including the Jaw of evidence. WIGMORE, SUPP. TO 
TREATISE vii ( I908). 
40. WIGMORE, SUPP. TO TREATISE vi. 
4I. I have discussed this change in the professional elite in Michael Ariens, Know the Law: A History 
of Legal Specialization, 45 S.C. L. REV. II 03 (1994). See also supra note 39. 
42. EDMUND M. MORGAN, ET AL., THE LAW OF EVIDENCE: SOME PROPOSALS FOR ITS REFORM xii n.I 
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Committee's report contained five specific proposals, including two proposals to admit 
statements otherwise excluded by the rule barring hearsay evidence. The first permitted 
the introduction of a hearsay statement if made by a person who died before the trial. This 
reform proposal was based on a Massachusetts law enacted in 1898.43 The second was 
a proposal to liberalize the admission of business records, otherwise classified as hearsay 
statements. 44 
This latter proposal was enacted the next year in New York.45 In 1930, in Johnson 
v. Lutz,46 the New York Court of Appeals concluded that a police report of an accident, 
which included statements made to the officer by bystanders, who may not have had 
personal knowledge of the accident, was not within the operation of the Act because those 
bystanders were under no duty to make any statement to the officer. On June 20, 1936, 
based on a four-page report from the Senate Judiciary Committee47 and without any 
recorded debate, Congress passed the Commonwealth Fund Evidence Committee's 
proposal concerning business records. 48 
Two additional evidentiary reform efforts were undertaken in the 1930s. The first 
was an effort led by Wigmore under the auspices of the American Bar Association. 49 
Among the twenty specific proposals made by the ABA Committee on Improvements in 
the Law of Evidence was a proposal to amend the common law rule concerning the 
admissibility ofbusiness records as an exception to the hearsay rule. 5° Additi9nally, the 
Committee recommended adoption of the "Massachusetts" rule permitting the 
introduction of hearsay statements made by persons who had died by the time of the trial, 
as long as the statements were made in good faith before the controversy arose. 51 
However, the Committee noted "a probable lack of united professional support for any 
radical, or even any substantial changes."52 
( 1927). This language constituted Wigmore's opinion, and was actually taken from a statement of his in his 
Treatise. See TREATISE II, supra note 37, at§ 8c. 
43. MORGAN, supra note 42, at 37-49. 
44. MORGAN, supra note 42, at 51-63. 
45. 1928 N.Y. Laws, ch. 532. This law was codified as § 374-a of the Civil Practice Code of New 
York. 
46. 170 N.E. 517 (N.Y. 1930). 
47. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITIEE REPORT, ADMISSIBILITY IN EVIDENCE OF CERTAIN WRITINGS AND 
RECORDS, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., Rep. No. 1965, April 24, 1936 [hereinafter COMMITIEE REPORT]. 
48. 28 U.S.C. § 695. 
49. Report ofthe Committee on Improvements [n the Law of Evidence, 63 A.B.A. REP. 570 (1938) 
[hereinafter Report]. 
50. /d. at 582-83. This was the second of twenty proposals offered. The Committee preferred the 
adoption of the Uniform Laws Conference Draft of 1936, because it was an "improvement" of the language used 
in the Commonwealth Fund reform proposal, but recommended both proposals, as well as a a third proposal by 
a Northwestern University Law School student, Roscoe L. Barrow, in a 1937 article. See Roscoe L. Barrow, 
Comment, Business Entries Before the Court, 32 ILL. L. REv. 334 (1937). 
51. Report, supra note 49, at 584-85. 
52. Report, supra note 49, at 570. 
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The second and most thorough effort to reform the law of evidence was the American 
Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence. 53 The Institute's reporter was Morgan, whose 
reputation in the field of evidence was second only to Wigmore's. Unlike Wigmore, 
Morgan was not content to draft a code embracing incremental reform. In the first of four 
articles published in the American Bar Association Journal concerning the Model Code 
of Evidence, Morgan declared, "It is time, too, for the radical reformation of the law of 
evidence. "54 Much of the radical reformation of the law of evidence consisted in giving 
greater discretion to trial judges to admit or exclude evidence. In Morgan's view, 
however, the most "radical" provision concerned reform of hearsay.55 The Code 
specifically proposed the adoption of a broad hearsay exception for business records56 and 
an exception admitting hearsay statements made by persons no longer alive at the time of 
trial. 57 At the same time the American Law Institute formally approved the Model Code 
of Evidence, 58 Judge Jerome Frank was authoring an opinion that would assist in halting 
the efforts to promote evidentiary reform. 
II. THE ORIGINS OF HOFFMAN V. PALMER 
On Christmas Day, 1940, at about 3:15 p.m., newlyweds59 Howard Hoffman, a 
twenty-four-year old graduate of Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI) and recently 
employed construction engineer, and his twenty-three-year old wife Inez T. Spraker 
Hoffman, a Vassar graduate, began their trip back home to Hartford, Connecticut from the 
home of Inez's parents in Cooperstown, New York. On Route 41 in West Stockbridge, 
Massachusetts, at about 6:10p.m., on a "dark, pitch black"60 yet "clear"61 night, a Ford 
coupe, driven by Howard, collided with a train of the New York, New Haven, and 
53. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE (1942). 
54. Edmund M. Morgan, Jr., The Code of Evidence Proposed by the American Law Institute, 27 A.B.A. 
J. 539, 540 (Sept. 1941 ). This was the first of four consecutively published articles with the same title. See also 
Edmund M. Morgan, Foreward to MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 6 (1942). 
55. See Morgan, Code of Evidence, supra note 54, at 595 ("Consequently it is in the chapter on Hearsay 
that the code departs most widely from the common law."); Charles T. McCormick, The New Code of Evidence 
of the American Law Institute, 20 TEX. L. REv. 661,671 (1942) ("The draftsman [Morgan] describes Rule 503 
as the most radical departure from the common law in the whole Code.") (footnote omitted). 
56. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 514. 
57. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 503(a). 
58. 19 A.L.I. PROC. 74, 257 (1942). 
59. According to the complaint, the Hoffmans were married on August 10, 1940. Hoffman v. Palmer, 
Record at 12; Complaint at 9 [hereinafter Record] (on file with author). This, along with the following 
statements of Howard Hoffman's testimony and the testimony of the other witnesses, is taken from the record 
filed in Hoffman v. Palmer, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and from the Brief for 
Plaintiff-Appellee and Brief for Appellants (on file with author). The original record of the case is retained at 
the National Archives-Northeast Region, and a printed Transcript of Record to the Supreme Court (Palmer v. 
Hoffman, No. 300, October Term 1942) is also available on microfiche. 
60. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 3; Record, supra note 59, at 49 (testimony of Howard Hoffman that 
it was "pitch black" at the time of the accident). 
61. Record, supra note 59, at 215 (testimony ofNorma Mary Gennari); Brief for Appellants at 4. 
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Hartford Railroad Company. Inez died, and Howard was "severely and permanently"62 
injured. 
Howard Hoffman filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
ofNew York, claiming residence in "the Borough ofBrooklyn, County ofKings, City and 
State ofNew York."63 The railroad was incorporated in Connecticut, and maintained its 
principal office in New Haven, which created diversity of citizenship between the 
parties.64 Because the railroad was bankrupt and undergoing reorganization in federal 
district court in Connecticut, Hoffman obtained permission to file suit against Howard S. 
Palmer, Henry B. Sawyer and James Lee Loomis, all trustees of the Railroad.65 Hoffman 
alleged on his own behalf and as administrator for the estate of his wife that the railroad 
vio1ated its statutory duty of care under Massachusetts law as well as its common law duty 
of care.66 
Hoffman testified that he came to a stop fifteen to twenty feet from the Elkey-
Buckley railroad crossing, looked both ways, and saw no light and heard no bell. He then 
started up in first gear, travelling between three and five miles per hour as he approached 
the grade crossing. As he was just about over the near rail, he saw a dark mass closely 
approaching from his left. He still saw no light. The next thing he knew, he was a patient 
at the Pittsfield, Massachusetts hospital.67 To prove that no light was at the head of the 
train and that no warning sound by bell or whistle was made, Hoffman's counsel called 
several other witnesses. A car driven by Laurence Bona and including as passengers his 
wife ~illian and his siblings Arthur and Edna was on Route 41 travelling the opposite 
direction from the Hoffmans. Because they had seen "a" train go by three-fourths of a 
mile southeast of the crossing where the accident took place, the Banas all testified that 
they knew a train might be coming. They heard no bells or whistles as they approached 
the crossing. Arthur heard a crash and Laurence was the first person to reach the 
Hoffmans after the accident. The other witness for the plaintiff, Norma Gennari, testified 
62. According to the complaint, his injuries included "a compound comminuted fracture of the right 
leg[,] ... comminuted fracture of the left femur," several lacerations on his head and face, a concussion and a 
two inch puncture of the right femur. Record, supra note 59, at 6; Complaint at 3. In testimony, Hoffman stated 
that he remained in the hospital from the time of the accident until the end of May 1942, a six month period. 
Record, supra note 59, at 56-58. 
63. Record, supra note 59, at 4; Complaint at 4. At the trial, Hoffman stated that he was temporarily 
residing in Troy, New York, taking graduate engineering classes at RPI, but continued to claim permanent 
residence in Brooklyn. Records at the Alumni Office at RPI indicate that Hoffman never received a master's 
degree. Hoffman died on May 18, 1982. 
64. Record, supra note 59, at 19; Answer at 1. If Hoffman had continued to maintain his residence in 
Hartford, as it was before the accident, the case could not have been filed in federal court. 
65. For simplicity's sake, I will refer to defendants as "the railroad." 
66. That civil cases are resolved much more slowly today than in the past is indicated by the speed with 
which this case was concluded. Suit was filed on July 17, 1941, and final judgment was rendered on November 
25, 1941. The opinion ofthe United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was released on June 23, 
1942 (an amended opinion was released on July 31, 1942), and the Supreme Court decided the case on February 
1, 1943. If you're counting, that means that the entire case, from filing to judgment by the Supreme Court, took 
just slightly more than 18 months. 
67. Record, supra note 59, at 49-55. 
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that as she walked home that evening, about 600 feet from the site of the accident, she 
heard no whistle or bell, but did hear the crash. 
The train, consisting of an engine with a tender and a caboose, was backing up. The 
caboose was attached to the nose of the engine. Thus, the tender of the engine was the 
"front" of the train, and was the first part of the train to cross the Elkey-Buckley 
intersection. 
The Railroad claimed its agents acted with due care and asserted that Hoffman was 
contributorily negligent. To prove a whistle blew and a bell sounded, the defense offered 
the testimony of the conductor, a brakeman and flagman riding in the caboose, the sister 
and brother of the conductor, and five other witnesses.68 The defense also offered the 
testimony of Harry Meach, the fireman, who testified he saw the Hoffman's car approach 
the crossing, slow down about eighteen to twenty feet from the crossing, and then speed 
up as the head of the tender arrived at the crossing. 69 Meach did not see the tender hit the 
car, turning his head "so that I couldn't see what happened when we got by. I didn't care 
to witness it, in other words."70 Additionally, Norma Gennari testi.fied that the coupe was 
travelling between thirty and thirty-five miles per hour when it disappeared from her view. 
The defendant noted that the point at which the coupe would have disappeared from 
Norma Gennari's view was between twenty and seventy feet from the railroad track.71 
The Railroad also offered testimony regarding inconsistent statements made by the Bonas 
and Norma Gennari that cast doubt on whether they had not heard a whistle or bell, 72 as 
well as a statement by Laurence Bona in which he described his encounter with Hoffman 
in the hospital after the accident. Bona claimed that "[Hoffman] said he stopped for the 
crossing and what he saw was the back of the train. He thought the train was gone by and 
he started up and it hit him and that is all he could remember. He was in tough shape."73 
At trial, Bona denied making this statement. 74 
The Railroad argued that Hoffman had mistakenly believed the "front" of the train, 
that is, the tender, was actually the "end" of the train. The mistake led him to think the 
train had crossed the intersection when it had actually just entered the intersection. The 
jury evidently disagreed with the Railroad's theory of the case, finding for the plaintiff in 
both his individual and administrative capacities. 75 On November 25, 1941, an order was 
entered granting judgment to Howard Hoffman in the amount of $25,077.35 and to him 
68. See generally Record, supra note 59, at 263-421. Two of those witnesses, the engineer's widow 
Bertha McDermott, and her son's friend, Francis James Hoerman, testified more about the engineer's actions 
before coming upon the Elkey-Buckley intersection than what happened as the train approached the intersection. 
A sixth defense witness, fifteen-year old Amenio Selva, testified that he saw a light but heard no whistle from 
his vantage point about 1500 feet from the crossing. Record, supra note 59, at 396-400. 
69. See Record, supra note 59, at 329-53. 
70. Record, supra note 59, at 339. 
71. Brief for Appellants, supra note 59, at 7. 
72. Record, supra note 59, at 373-80; 409-10. 
73. Record, supra note 59, at 376 (testimony of stenographer Henry R. Hunt). 
74. Record, supra note 59, at 116-17. 
75. Record, supra note 59, at 441. 
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as the Administrator of the estate of Inez in the amount of $9000.76 The Railroad 
appealed. 
On appeal, the Railroad listed four errors. One claimed error was placing the burden 
of proof of contributory negligence on the defendant. The other three claimed errors 
were evidentiary. In order, the claimed errors included: (1) the refusal of the trial court 
to permit the testimony, on direct examination, of the observations of a defense witness 
concerning the line of sight at the Elkey-Buckley crossing; (2) the exclusion of an 
interview of the engineer of the train, Harold McDermott, who died before the trial, by 
J.W. Cuineen,77 Assistant Superintendent of the Railroad, which occurred in the presence 
of E.J. Conley of the Legal Department of the Railroad, W.E. Christie of the 
Massachusetts Public Utilities Commission 78 and S. Byrne, lieutenant of railroad police; 
and (3) the court's ruling permitting the plaintiff to introduce in evidence a written 
statement given by Laurence Bona to Hoffman's lawyer if defense counsel requested to 
see the statement. 
The Railroad's brief consisted of twenty-one printed pages, of which thirteen were 
dedicated to the four claims of error. On the issue that made this case famous, the 
exclusion of the engineer's statement, the Railroad used less than two pages to make its 
argument.79 While acknowledging the finality of the jury's verdict on disputed issues of 
fact, the attention given to the facts by the appellant was apparently designed to highlight 
the claimed error concerning burden of proof on the issue of contributory negligence. 80 
76. As evidence that the award in favor of Howard Hoffman was a substantial verdict for the era, note 
that seven years after the verdict, in 1948, in the first volume of the NACCA Law Journal, a publication of the 
National Association of Claimants' Compensation Attorneys, included was a section titled "Verdicts or Awards 
exceeding $50,000." See 1 NACCA L.J. 99 (1948). After detailing several verdicts, the two page section 
concluded with, "NACCA is interested in reporting large verdicts or compensation awards because of their 
manifest interest to members of the bar. Please report those in excess of $50,000 .... " !d. at 100. Under 
Massachusetts wrongful death Jaw, see MASS. GEN. L. ch. 229 § 3 (Ter. ed. 1932), the measure of damages was 
"not Jess than five hundred nor more than ten thousand doJJars, to be assessed with reference to the degree of 
culpability" of the Railroad, so the award to the estate of Inez Hoffman was nearly the maximum aJJowed by 
law. 
77. In the Brief for Plaintiff-AppeJJee, Cuineen's name is speJJed "Cuneen." Brief for Plaintiff-
AppeJJee, supra note 59, at 9. 
78. After Cuineen finished questioning McDermott, Christie asked three questions of the engineer. See 
infra note 117. 
79. The "argument" consisted of a quotation of the statute, an indented citation to three Second Circuit 
cases interpreting the statute, and a conclusory statement that, "A reading of engineer McDermott's statement 
shows its relevancy and materiality on aJJ the issues of negligence submitted to the jury-headlight, whistle, and 
bell." Brief for Appellants, supra note 59, at 14. 
80. At the close of its discussion of the facts, the brief for appellant concluded, "Naturally the trial court 
said it could not substitute its opinion for the opinion of the jury. Burden of proof as to contributory negligence 
became a very practical consideration. We shall discuss other aspects ofthe evidence under the appropriate Jaw 
points." Brief for Appellants, supra note 59, at 7. Hoffman claimed that the Railroad violated both 
Massachusetts statutory Jaw as weJJ as the common Jaw. The possibly differing bases of these claims raised 
problems under the rule in the then recently decided case of Erie Ry. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The 
emphasis on the issue ofburden of proof was in part a consequence of the Supreme Court's decision in Klaxon 
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In response, the plaintiffs brief was largely occupied with the issue of the burden of 
proof of contributory negligence. More than eight pages of this twenty page brief were 
dedicated to that issue, and less than one-and-a-half pages discussed the exclusion of the 
business records. 81 Appellant's reply brief discussed only the issue of the allocation of 
the burden of proof of the issue of contributory negligence. 82 
The reply brief for the appellant railroad was filed with the Second Circuit clerk on 
May 11, 1942.83 The court's decision was first released on June 23, 1942. An amended 
opinion dated July 31, 1942 \Vas published in the West Federal Reporter.84 
III. THE CAST OF CHARACTERS 
The case of Hoffman v. Palmer was heard before a panel consisting of Thomas W. 
Swan,85 Charles E. Clark,86 and Jerome N. Frank. Both Swan and Clark had formerly held 
the position ofDean at Yale Law School. Swan was Dean from 1916 through 1926, when 
he was appointed to the court. Swan was conservative in an age that equated liberal with 
progressive, had married into wealth, yet was considered "a first-rate professional"87 
whose work as Dean had made Yale Law School a better and more progressive school. 
Swan remained on the bench until the late 1950s, and was noted for his work in 
commercial law. 88 
Swan appointed Clark to the Yale Law School faculty in 1919. Ten years later, Clark 
was appointed Dean, after the whirlwind deanship of Robert M. Hutchins, and remained 
Dean until 1939, when he was made a judge of the Second Circuit. Clark is best known 
for his reform work as Reporter to the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 89 His affection90 for the rules of procedure resulted in Learned Hand 
v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), decided less than six months before the trial in Hoffman v. 
Palmer, which interpreted Erie to require federal courts in diversity cases to apply the conflict of laws rule of 
the state in which they sit. 
81. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 59. The discussion of the exclusion of the business record 
began at page 9 and concluded approximately a quarter down the next page. The burden of proof issue began 
at page 12 of the brief and concluded at page 20. The first five-and-one-half pages of the Brief were devoted 
to a recitation of the pleadings and facts. 
82. Reply Brief for Appellants, supra note 59. The reply brief was six pages in length. 
83. See Reply Brief for Appellants, supra note 59, at first page (date-stamp of receipt of brief). 
84. Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1942). 
85. On Swan, see Learned Hand, Thomas Walter Swan, 57 YALE L. J. 167 (1947); Eugene V. Rostow, 
Thomas W. Swan, 1877-1975, 85 YALE L.J. 159 (1975); Arthur L. Corbin, The Yale Law School and Tom Swan, 
YALE L. REP., Spring 1958, at 2; SCHICK, supra note 9, at 19-23. 
86. On Clark, see JUDGE CHARLES EDWARD CLARK (Peninah Petruck ed. 1991 ); Eugene V. Rostow, 
Judge Charles E. Clark, 73 YALE L.J. 1 (1963). A bibliography of articles about Clark is found in SCHICK, 
supra note 9, at 361. See generally LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-60, at 115-40 ( 1986). 
As is the case with Morgan, there is no entry on Clark in the Dictionary of American Biography. 
87. GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 282 ( 1994) (noting comment made 
to Hand by Ned Burling). 
88. John P. Frank, The Top Commercial Court, FORTUNE, Jan. 1951, at 92. 
89. On the history of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity 
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frequently, and sarcastically, referring to him as "The GLAPP," or "The Greatest Living 
Authority on Practice and Procedure."91 Unlike Swan, Clark was a long-time political 
liberal and progressive reformer. 
Frank, who assumed office on May 5, 1941, was the author of Law and the Modern 
Mind and a controversial New Dealer.92 He was educated at the University of Chicago 
and practiced law in that city for many years before moving to New York to practice on 
Wall Street. He was an indefatigable reader, curious about almost everything, and a 
prolific writer of a number of books and law review articles. Although he was considered 
brilliant by colleagues and acquaintances and found by nearly everyone to be "warm and 
personable,"93 Frank was sensitive to criticism,94 and apparently "unable to concede a 
point to an intellectual opponent. "95 
In contrast to the stellar abilities and accomplishments of the members of the panel 
hearing the appeal, the lawyers for the parties were nondescript. Hoffman's counsel of 
record,96 Benjamin Diamond, was a 1930 graduate of the law school at St. Lawrence 
University in Canton, New York, and a sole practitioner in Brooklyn.97 The trial and 
appellate arguments were conducted, however, by ·william Paul Allen. Allen, born in 
1883, was a member of the firm ofFearey, Allen and Johnston until1942, when he and 
Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987); Peter 
Charles Hoffer, Text, Translation, Context, Conversation: Preliminary Notes for Decoding the Deliberations 
of the Advisory Committee that Wrote the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 37 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 409 (1993). 
See also Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1015 (1982). 
90. Professor Gunther, Learned Hand's biographer, calls it Clark's "passion." GUNTHER, supra note 
87, at 522. 
91. GUNTHER, supra note 87, at 300, 522. Gunther notes that Hand sent a ditty to his colleague Harrie 
Chase about Clark's devotion to the "wules," as Clark apparently p~onounced them. 
Dare we construe any wule sans Charles? I submit the following verses: 
There once was a fellow named Clark 
Who thought it a Hell of a lark 
To discuss about wules, 
And then call us fools, 
Because we were so in the dark. 
GUNTHER, supra note 87, at 522 (quoting Letter from Learned Hand to Harrie Chase (April24, 1940)). Clark's 
impression on Hand must have been strong, for when this letter was sent, Clark had been a member of the court 
only slightly more than a year. 
92. On Frank's firing from the Agriculture Adjustment Administration, see PETER N. IRONS, THE NEW 
DEAL LAWYERS 173-80 (1982); GLENNON, supra note 9, at 98-101. 
93. GLENNON, supra note 9, at 24 (including in the group the philosopher Morris Cohen, with whom 
Frank engaged in lengthy intellectual disagreement in the early 1930s). 
94. GLENNON, supra note 9, at 24. See also GUNTHER, supra note 87, at 527 ("[W]hile [Frank] himself 
was quite sensitive to perceived slights, he was uninhibited in inflicting wounds on his adversaries."). 
95. GLENNON, supra note 9, at 23. 
96. By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, William Paul Allen was listed as the counsel of 
Howard Hoffman, and Diamond was listed as "of counsel." See Brief for Respondent, Palmer v. Hoffman, No. 
300, October Term 1942 (on file with author). 
97. 1 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY 1137 (72d ed. 1940). 
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Eugene P. Fitzpatrick formed the firm of Allen and Fitzpatrick.98 On appeal to the Second 
Circuit,99 Diamond and Allen were joined by Edward H. Wilson and Milton Dombroff. 
Wilson, sixty-six years old, was a graduate ofNew York Law School, and Dombroffwas 
a 1931 graduate of St. John's University Law School. Both men were sole practitioners, 
and Allen, Wilson and Dombroff all practiced law at 70 Pine Street in New York City. 100 
Counsel for the Railroad throughout this litigation was Edward R. Brumley, whose brief 
listing in Martindale-Hubbell noted only his location at Grand Central Terminal. 101 Only 
Wilson, who received an "a v" rating, was rated by Martindale-Hubbell. Presiding at the 
trial was Matthew Abruzzo, the least respected federal district judge within the Second 
Circuit. 102 
Finally, there is Morgan, 103 known to friends and acquaintances as Eddie. Morgan 
was a short, thin, quite handsome man, and, as a longtime member of the American Law 
Institute, professor at Harvard Law School (1925-50) and editorial director of the 
University Casebook series of Foundation Press, a prominent member of the legal 
establishment. Morgan was also stubborn and argumentative, traits he traced to his Welsh 
heritage, a heritage of which he was quite proud. In mid-1942, at the age of sixty-three, 
with the departure of James Landis to Washington, Morgan was appointed Acting Dean 
of Harvard Law School, a position he would hold for the remainder of World War II. 
After the third call from his alma mater, Morgan became a member of the Harvard Law 
98. S,ee id. at 1068 (listing in Biographical Section firm of Fearey, Allen and Johnston); 1 
MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY 1137 (74th ed. 1942) (listing in Biographical Section firm of Allen 
and Fitzpatrick). The Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee in the Second Circuit, supra note 59, makes no mention of 
either "firm," and these organizations may have been office arrangements more than partnerships. Allen also 
argued the case before the United States Supreme Court. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 110 (1943). 
99. The Brief for Respondent filed in the Supreme Court lists only Allen and Diamond. 
100. All this information is taken from the 72d edition of the Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory. 
Neither Wilson nor Dombroff placed a listing in the Directory's Biographical Section. Instead, each was simply 
given a one-line summary. See 1 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY 1355, 1446 (72d ed. 1940). 
101. This listing is the same for the years 1938-42. See id. at 1342. Listed as of counsel to the trustees 
for the Railroad in the petition for certiorari were B.J. Seifert and A.G. Kuhbach, and in the petition for 
rehearing A.G. Kuhbach and R.W. Rickard. As Frank noted in his opinion, Brumley represented the Railroad 
in previous litigation. See Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976, 998 (2nd Cir. 1941 ). 
102. SCHICK, supra note 9, at 137-38 ("While Learned Hand was chief judge none ofthe several dozen 
district judges within the Second Circuit was as lowly regarded or criticized so often in print by the appellate 
court as was Abruzzo."). One district judge who came close, however, was Judge Robert A. Inch, also a district 
judge in the Eastern District ofNew York, disparagingly called "Judge Millimeter" by Hand. See GUNTHER, 
supra note 87, at 302. 
103. In addition to the cast of characters noted above, I could include Justice William 0. Douglas, who 
wrote the opinion for the Supreme Court unanimously affirming the decision of the Second Circuit. Douglas 
was a friend of Frank's from the earliest days of the New Deal. See William 0. Douglas, Foreword to A MAN's 
REACH: THE PHILOSOPHY OF JUDGE JEROME FRANK, supra note 1, at xvii. Clark was Dean when William 0. 
Douglas was hired as a professor at Yale. He also was Dean when Jerome Frank received an appointment in 
1934 as research associate at Yale, although this appointment apparently meant little, for Frank did not spend 
any time in New Haven then. Frank began teaching at Yale as an adjunct professor after World War II, and thus 
well after Clark had left Yale for the Second Circuit. 
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School faculty in 1925. 104 Before Harvard, Morgan taught at the University of Minnesota 
and Yale, respectively. Morgan knew Swan105 and Clark quite well from his years at 
Yale. After five years at the University of Minnesota, Morgan was hired by Dean Tom 
Swan to begin teaching at Yale in the fall of 1917, although he did not arrive until 1919, 
after two years in Washington in the Judge Advocate Corps. During the six years Morgan 
taught at Yale, he was a colleague of both Charles E. Clark, who also joined the Yale law 
faculty in 1919, and Tom Swan, who was Dean throughout Morgan's years at Yale. In 
addition to Evidence, Morgan taught Civil Procedure and Practice Court at Yale. Clark 
also taught Civil Procedure. 
In 1935, Clark was named Reporter for the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure. One of the most influential members of the Committee was Morgan, 
the author of a casebook on Pleading. In 1939, Morgan was appointed Reporter of the 
American Law Institute's (ALI) Committee on the Model Code of Evidence. In an 
attempt to avoid an initial attack on the Committee's competence, as well as to prevent 
interference with its work, the unchallenged authority on the American law of evidence, 
John Henry Wigmore, was named Chief Consultant. 106 Morgan and Wigmore's wary 
relationship dated back over twenty years, to their work at the Judge Advocate Corps in 
Washington during World War I. 107 In 1940, when Wigmore attacked the structure of the 
proposed Model Code, claiming it was not specific enough, it was Clark who suggested 
I 04. See Corbin, supra note 85, at 25. 
105. Swan graduated from Harvard Law School in 1903, and Morgan graduated from there in 1905. 
do not know whether they knew each other as students. 
106. In a letter dated December 6, 1938 to William Draper Lewis, Executive Director of the ALI, Morgan 
wrote asking "whether any group drafting a code of Evidence can be formed without including Wigmore. To 
include him would doubtless extend the time required to get the job done. To exclude him would, I should 
suppose, require an explanation which it would be rather embarrassing to make." Letter from Edmund M. 
Morgan to William Draper Lewis (December 6, 1938) (Edmund M. Morgan Papers, Harvard Law School 
Library, Box 1, Folder 2) [hereinafter Morgan Papers]. The decision to give the seventy-five-year old Wigmore 
the title of Chief Consultant (along with a salary of$100 per month) but exclude him from the Committee was 
intended to both placate Wigmore and allow Morgan to draft a code as he desired. 
107. In early 1919, a dispute over the fairness of the system of military justice erupted. A military 
general in the judge advocate corps and Acting Judge Advocate General, Gen. Samuel T. Ansell, promoted 
reform. His superior, Judge Advocate General Enoch H. Crowder, rejected Ansell's call for reform and demoted 
him to his prewar rank of Lieutenant Colonel. Supporting players chose sides: Morgan, a major, publicly 
supported Ansell, and Wigmore, promoted to colonel during the War, supported Crowder. In June, 1919, 
Morgan and Wigmore engaged in public debate before the Maryland State Bar Association about the system 
of military justice. See Address by Col. John H. Wigmore before the Maryland State Bar Association (June 28, 
1919), in 24 Mo. ST. B. TRANS. 183 ( 1919); Address by Col. Edmund M. Morgan before the Maryland State 
Bar Association (June 28, 1919), in 24 Mo. ST. B. TRANS. 197 ( 1919). I plan to write about this event in greater 
detail, for I believe it offers some insight into the relatively chilly relationship between Wigmore and Morgan 
and may help to explain their differences of opinion concerning specific rules and the general structure of the 
rules of evidence. On the Crowder-Ansell debate, compare Terry W. Brown, The Crowder-Ansell Dispute: The 
Emergence of General Samuel T. Ansell, 35 MIL. L. REv. 1 (1967) (concluding Ansell's position was right) with 
Frederick Bernays Wiener, The Seamy Side of the World War I Court-Martial Controversy, 123 MIL. L. REV. 
I 09 ( 1989) (blaming Ansell for the dispute). 
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the proposed draft was too specific. As Morgan later put it, the choice was "between a 
catalogue, a creed, and a Code. The Institute decided in favor of a code. " 1 08 
In the 1930s, Morgan and Frank began a fitful exchange of correspondence. It started 
after Frank's article, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-Schoo/?, 109 was published. Morgan, 
whose work developing "Practice Court" at both the University of Minnesota and Yale 
was something of which he was very proud, wrote Frank a letter criticizing some of 
Frank's proposals. Frank replied in defense of his proposal, Morgan responded defending 
his criticism, and the pattern of future exchanges was set. 110 
On May 26, 1942, Frank wrote Morgan, 
Dear Eddie: 
We have a question of evidence which might interest you. The issue is the 
admissibility of a report made to his employer by a railroad engineer following 
a collision between his train and an automobile. I'm especially interested to 
know whether, if such reports were customarily made after accidents, you would 
call them entries made in the regular course of business, and whether you have 
considered the problem in your various capacities as Commonwealth Fund 
Expert, A.L.I. Restater, etc. 111 
Morgan replied, "The inquiry in your letter of May 26 seems to me to admit of an 
easy answer. I should classify the reports made in the regular course of duty by the 
108. Edmund M. Morgan, Foreward to MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 13 (1942). The story of the Model 
Code of Evidence is detailed in Ariens, Progress Is Our Only Product, supra note 12, at 229-37. Clark declinec;l 
an invitation to serve as a consultant to the Model Code Committee due to his "real concern over the product." 
His concern was that the code was too particularized, the "great bane of the law of evidence today" and 
something which was "against the. modem trend." Letter from Charles Clark to William Draper Lewis (February 
23, 1940) (Morgan Papers, supra note 106, at Box 2, Folder 2). Clark would later air his disagreement with the 
drafters of the Code at the Annual Meeting of the ALI in May 1940. See I 7 A.L.I. PROC. 66, 80-84 (1940). 
109. Jerome N. Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 907 (1933). 
110. See Letter from Morgan to Frank (July 5, 1933); Letter from Frank to Morgan (July 11, 1933); 
Letter from Morgan to Frank (August 11, 1933). All correspondence between Frank and Morgan is found in 
the Jerome N. Frank Papers, Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University, Box 14, Folder 166 (1933, 1935 
correspondence), Box 61, Folder 631 (1941-45, 1947-48, 1952 correspondence) [hereinafter Frank Papers], and 
Edmund M. Morgan Papers, supra note 106, at Box 5, Folders 4, 8, 9, 10, and Box 6, Folder 1. Frank's 
sensitivity to criticism is well displayed in his July 11, 1933 letter to Morgan. Frank claimed that Morgan, in 
reviewing a book titled A Judge Takes the Stand, had implicitly attacked Frank and had accused him of being 
"some kind of brash publicity seeker" and of writing Law and the Modern Mind "in a lurid fashion in order to 
make it sell." Letter from Jerome Frank to Edmund M. Morgan (July 11, 1938) (Frank Papers, supra, at Box 
14, Folder 166; Morgan Papers, supra note 106, at Box 5, Folder 4). Morgan denied making such charges and 
claimed, "Indeed, I have a strong suspicion that the differences in our views would settle down to differences 
in emphasis." Letter from Edmund M. Morgan to Jerome Frank (August 11, 1933) (Frank Papers, supra, at Box 
14, Folder 166: Morgan Papers, supra note 106, at Box 5, Folder 4). 
111. Letter from Jerome N. Frank to Edmund M. Morgan (May 26, 1942) (Frank Papers, supra note 110, 
at Box 61, Folder 631; Morgan Papers, supra note 106, at Box 5, Folder 8). 
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engineer as statements or entries made in the regular course ofbusiness." 112 Later in the 
same letter, Morgan wrote, 
The case which you suggest is clearly distinguishable from Johnson v. Lutz, 253 
N.Y. 124, for t4ere was no duty on the by-standers to report to the policemen, 
and I take it that in your case there was a duty on the engineer to make the 
investigation and report what he found .... 113 • 
Frank responded ten days later by writing, "As to my views-well, I'd better say nothing 
until our opinion is published. " 114 
IV. HOFFMAN V. PALMER 
A. The Opinion 
Frank's opinion is masterful. For a lawyer who spent nearly all of his career as a 
private lawyer in corporate reorganization work and most of his career in public service 
creating the administrative state, his use of sources is amazingly broad. He was given 
little help by the parties' briefs, no help at all by the trial court's decision, 115 and still 
managed to write an opinion covering nearly twenty pages of the Federal Reports in 
approximately a month's time. Although a judge for just slightly over a year, the opinion 
is crafted in Frank's peculiar style; it is an essay of an autodidact about both law and the 
human condition, captured in the framework of an opinion. 
Frank's opinion affirmed the judgment in favor of the plaintiff Hoffman. On the 
issue the lawyers believed most important, the issue of the burden of proof concerning 
contributory negligence, the panel unanimously (and quite briefly) agreed that the trial 
112. Letter from Edmund M. Morgan to Jerome N. Frank (May 29, 1942) (Frank Papers, supra note 110, 
at Box 61, Folder 631; Morgan Papers, supra note 106, at Box 5, Folder 8). 
113. Letter from Edmund M. Morgan to Jerome N. Frank (May 29, 1942) (Frank Papers, supra note 110, 
at Box 61, Folder 631; Morgan Papers, supra note 106, at Box 5, Folder 8). 
114. Letter from Jerome N. Frank to Edmund M. Morgan (June 8, 1942) (Frank Papers, supra note 110, 
at Box 61, Folder 631; Morgan Papers, supra note 106, at Box 5, Folder 9). Frank then continued his letter by 
asking Morgan a number of questions concerning the ALrs Model Code of Evidence, whose Reporter was 
Morgan. 
115. The record in the case indicates the following colloquy concerning the admissibility of the 
engineer's statement: 
Mr. Brumley: The defendants offer in evidence the statement of the engineer, who the proof 
indicates is now dead, a statement taken in the regular course of business, the defendant claims, after the 
accident happened. 
The statement was signed by the engineer, and is marked for identification as Exhibit J, under 
Section 695 USCA 28. 
The defendants offer the proof also that this statement was signed in the regular course of any 
business, and that it was the regular course of such business to make such statement. 
Mr. Allen: I object to the statement. 
The Court: Mr. Allen objects to the introduction of this statement in evidence, and the Court 
sustains the objection and grants an exception to the defendant. 
Record, supra note 59, at 421. 
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court had properly assigned the burden of proof to the railroad. 116 Although only 
perfunctory attention was paid the issue of the admissibility of the engineer's report1 17 by 
116. Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976,998, 1002 (2d Cir. 1942). In the Supreme Court, the issue was 
not dismissed quite so summarily. Although the trial court may have correctly placed the burden of proving 
contributory negligence on the defendant concerning the Massachusetts statutory claim, the court probably erred 
in placing this burden on the defendant regarding the common law claim. However, because the defendant did 
not differentiate between the statutory and common law claims in his request for an instruction placing the 
burden concerning contributory negligence on the plaintiff, the defendant's general exception to the court's 
decision to place the burden on the defendant was not specific enough to "obtain a new trial." Palmer v. 
Hoffman, 318 U.S. I 09, 116-20 (1943). 
1 17. The "statement" of the engineer, Harold D. McDermott, is as follows: 
Q. [by Mr. J.W. Cuineen, Assistant Superintendent of the Railroad]: How long employed by the 
New Haven Railroad? 
A. 33 years. 
Q. In what capacity? A. Fireman and Engineer. 
Q. How long an Engineer? A. 22 years. 
Q. You are qualified on the characteristics ofthe Railroad between Pittsfield, Great Barrington, and 
State Line? A. Yes, Sir. 
Q. You were engineer on engine 438 with Conductor Johnson on December 25th? A. Yes, Sir. 
Q. What time did you leave Daly's? A. 5:45P.M. 
Q. What did you have? A. Engine and caboose. 
Q. You were headed south? A. Backing up. 
Q. You had a back-up headlight on the tender? A. Yes, sir, a good one. 
Q. Where did you light it? A. Daly's. 
Q. Where was the caboose? A. On the nose of the engine. 
Q. Then the tender of the engine was the first vehicle out? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How many cars did you have leaving Pittsfield? A. I really don't know. 
Q. Did you use your air brakes between Pittsfield and Daly's? A. I don't remember. 
Q. Had you used your air brake before the accident? A. No. 
Q. When you coupled onto the caboose at Daly's did you test your air? A. No. 
Q. Why not? A. Just didn't, cut the air in and doubled the pressure. 
Q. Did you make a running test? A. No, sir. 
Q. Aproaching Weststockbridge, the first highway crossing north of the station what whistle signals 
were given for that crossing? A. Regulation crossing whistle two long two short repeated. 
Q. Where? A. Whistling post and repeated to finish just as the engine hit the crossing. 
Q. You have an automatic bell ringer? A. Yes. 
Q. When did you start it? A. It was gong all the way from the whistling post at the first crossing 
until after the accident happened. 
Q. What was the weather condition? A. Clear. 
Q. How fast were you running between W. Stockbridge and where the accident occurred? A. 15 
m.p.h. 
Q. When did you last observe that the light on the tender was burning? A. When I put it out at State 
Line. 
Q. It was burning after the accident? A. Yes. 
Q. When you were backing up did you notice any automobiles on your side of the crossing? A. Yes, 
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there was one on the hill approaching the crossing. 
Q. Did you notice any on the other side? A. No, I can't see the crossing on account of the tender. 
Q. You only seen that one car standing there? A. Yes. Just the one. 
Q. What was the first intimation you had of the accident? A. I heard this peculiar noise and the 
fireman hollered that we have got a car. I put the brakes in emergency. 
Q. Give her sand? A. Yes. 
Q. When the engine stopped how far was the engine north of the crossing? A. 1 Y2 to 2 pole lengths. 
Q. What was the weather condition at that time? A. Clear. 
Q. After you stopped did you get off the engine? A. I went back to see what damage was done. 
Q. What did you find? A. This Ford Coupe down the bank. 
Q. Was it on its side? A. I would say it was it was tipped at a ninety degree angle. 
Q. Which way was the auto traveling? A. Toward West Stockbridge pretty near due east. 
Q. Assuming that the Railroad is north and south as your time table says which way would the 
automobile be traveling? A. Coming from the east going west. 
Q. When you got back there what did you find? A. This overturned Ford Coupe with this lady and 
gentleman in it. 
Q. Where was the lady when you seen her? A. On the ground laying. down. The door was open. 
Q. Was she conscious? A. No. 
Q. Did you help to take her out of the car? A. No. 
Q. Was she alive? A. Yes, she was breathing but unconscious. I don't know how she got out on the 
ground. 
Q. Did you help take the man out? A. No, I did not. 
Q. What was his position in the car? A. He was pinned in by the steering wheel. 
Q. Did you make any inspection ofthe engine? A. Yes. 
Q. What did you find? A. The step on the tank bent and the step on the engine broken. 
Q. That would indicate that he ran into the side of the t~nk and was not dragged or pushed by the 
front of the tank? A. No, he hit with force to throw him against that pole and down the bank. 
Q. Did you notice any marks on the telephone pole? A. No, I did not. 
Q. Do you drive an automobile? A. Yes. 
Q. Have you driven over that crossing? A. Every day going to work and going home daily as much 
as anyone. 
Q. What kind of a road is it? A. State Road, rough it isn't cement, macadam. 
Q. In your experience in driving over that crossing how far back on the highway could you see a 
headlight of an approaching train? A. Why half a mile right near that house up there. 
Q. There is a little bridge down there how far is that from the tracks? A. 100 feet. 
Q. You would be able to see a train from there and stop in time for it? A. Yes, sir, ifyou had any 
brakes at all. 
Q. Assuming that you were traveling 15-18 m.p.h. how long would it take you to stop? A. About 
a car length. 
Q. When you applied the brakes did they function perfect? A. Yes, sir, 100%. 
Mr. Christie [of the Massachusetts Public Utility Commission]: 
Q. From what you saw the man was the driver of the car? A. Absolutely he was behind the wheel. 
Q. Where was your engine when you applied the brakes? A. I was over the crossing. I put the 
brakes on after he hit. It was all simultaneous. I heard the noise, the fireman hollered and I put the 
brakes on. Even if the fireman did not holler the action would have been the same. 
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either party, Frank began his discussion with this issue. 
Because Frank's opinion was an effort to affirm the judgment, it was structured to 
close off all avenues of escape from the sanction of the hearsay rule. Frank first assessed 
whether there was any applicable exception to the hearsay rule in the common law of 
evidence. Of course, the reason for the reform statute was precisely because the common 
law prohibited the introduction of the business report, so the conclusion to Frank's 
assessment was foregone. 118 Because the statement was "so plainly barred at common 
law," the only question remaining was whether the federal statute made the statement 
admissible. 119 
What was crucial, according to Frank, was the court's interpretation of the words 
"regular course of business" as used in the statute. These words, "twice employed in the 
legislation, are not colloquial words, but are words of art, with a long history."120 As a 
term of art, this phrase, which might to a layman "seem to mean any record or paper 
prepared by an employee in accordance with a rule established in that business by his 
employer," actually meant in the ')argon of lawyers and judges" only those records made 
in which there were "some safeguards against the existence of any exceptionally strong 
bias or powerful motive to misrepresent." 121 Because the common law history of the 
business records exception was rooted in the requirement of an absence of a motive to 
misrepresent, any statute using the phrase "regular course of business" "would, therefore, 
require unequivocal expressions in the statute or its legislative history to yield an 
interpretation of those words, defying their history, which would render admissible a 
memorandum made in circumstances that disclose the strongest likelihood of the existence 
of a motive to misrepresent."122 
To prove that the statute did not include this "unequivocal expression," Frank looked 
at the history of the reform statute, including its implementation and interpretation in New 
York. New York's interpretation was important in understanding the federal act because 
it was a "general rule that where a statute has been previously enacted in another 
jurisdiction, interpretations ... in another jurisdiction are to be followed." 123 These 
constructions were "peculiarly persuasive where the statute is designed to be 
Q. Your engine was in good mechanical condition? A. Yes, sir. 
I have read my statement consisting of 4 pages and it is true and correct. 
Signed HAROLD D. MCDERMOTT. 
Record, supra note 59, at 496-99 (Defendants' Exhibit J for Identification). 
118. In so holding, Frank concluded that the common law exception for business records was dependent 
on the declarant having "no peculiarly powerful motive to misrepresent; such a motive, if it exists must be 
relatively minimal and marginal." Hoffman, 129 F.2d at 980. In Frank's view, "the absence of any vigorous 
motive to misrepresent ... is inherent in virtually all the exceptions to the hearsay rule, such as declarations 
about private boundaries, statements or records concerning family history, spontaneous declarations, and dying 
declarations." /d. at 981. 
119. /d. at 983. 
120. /d. 
121. !d. at 984 (emphasis in original). 
122. !d. 
123. !d. at 985. 
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' uniform. '"124 Although the most well known New York precedent appeared to be 
Johnson v. Lutz, 125 Morgan had already noted a crucial difference between Lutz and 
Hoffman: Unlike the bystanders in Lutz, who "voluntarily" provided the information to 
the police officer whose report was offered as evidence, the engineer McDermott was 
under a duty to make a statement concerning the accident. Avoiding Lutz, Frank turned 
instead to a decision of the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, Needle 
v. New York Railways Corp. 126 Needle was decided shortly before the decision of the 
Court of Appeals in Lutz. In Needle, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court and 
held inadmissible a police blotter which contained statements made to the officer by 
bystanders as well as the conductor of the trolley car which struck the plaintiff as she was 
crossing Lexington Avenue in New York City. According to Frank, the court held the 
police blotter inadmissible in part because "his report was based on the oral statement of 
others, including, as the court said, that 'of the interested motorman, who, instead ofbeing 
so placed as to be presumed to be without a motive.to falsify in helping to make the 
record, had every reason to give a biased and false report. '"127 When Congress passed 
the reform statute in 1936, "[n]o change in its verbiage was suggested or was made to 
indicate an intention to deviate from that reasonable New York interpretation."128 A "not 
inflexible" rule of statutory construction required courts to follow the "reasonable" 
interpretation of a statute previously interpreted in another state, so Frank concluded that 
"the Needle case ... should be followed as entirely reasonable." 129 
To prove that Needle reasonably interpreted the reform statute and the phrase "regular 
course of business," Frank developed four lines of attack. First, he suggested the main 
reason for the statute may simply have been a dissatisfaction with the authentication 
requirement of the common law. 130 Second, he concluded that it was "without doubt" that 
the sponsors of the Model Act, Wigmore and Morgan, "did not intend to abolish the 
exception and to substitute another, by giving that phrase a meaning precisely opposite 
to that which they well knew was its recognized meaning."131 Third, "[i]t is our function 
to find out what Congress intended," and "we must not allow our personal preferences for 
124. !d. 
125. 170 N.E. 517 (N.Y. 1930). 
126. 237 N.Y.S. 547 (N.Y. App. Div. 1929). 
127. Hoffman, 129 F.2d at 984-85 (quoting Needle, 237 N.Y.S. at 549) (emphasis added by Frank). 
128. !d. at 985. 
129. !d. 
130. Frank noted that the Commonwealth Fund Evidence Committee criticized the common law rule for 
requiring the testimony of every person who was involved in the transaction, so "[ o ]ne reading the report of the 
Committee might, therefore, reasonably assume that perhaps its chief purpose was the desire to avoid the 
necessity of proving each link of such a chain." !d. at 986. 
131. !d. (emphasis in original). At a slightly later point in the opinion, Frank wrote: 
It is suggested that Morgan and Wigmore have said that it was intended that such reports should be 
admissible. But we have been unable to find that either of them has ever published any such 
comments, i.e., that they have ever discussed the problem which is here before us, in a case arising 
under the statute, either vis a vis the Needle case or otherwise. 
!d. at 990. But Frank had corresponded privately with Morgan, and knew Morgan's opinion regarding the 
"problem ... here before us," something he did not share publicly. 
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a more extensive reform to govern our decision."132 Because Congress chose to use rather 
than omit the phrase "regular course of business," and because those words enjoyed a 
specific historical meaning, "[ w ]e must assume that Congress used them deliberately with 
recognition of their history."133 Fourth, Frank concluded that even assuming the Lutz case 
was erroneously decided,134 Needle was clearly distinguishable from Lutz. 135 
In conclusion, then, engineer McDermott's statement was not admissible, because it 
"by its very nature, is dripping with motivations to misrepresent."136 After canvassing and 
disti~guishing any possible precedent in the Second Circuit, Frank concluded, "to repeat, 
we know of no case in any court holding, or even intimating, that such an obviously 
motivated record as that here before us is admissible under that Act."137 
To close the circle, and as if he were attempting to persuade Morgan, Frank noted the 
following: (1) The element of an absence of a motivation to misrepresent did not return 
the state of evidence law to the primitive days of a century ago, for both Wigmore, in his 
Treatise, and Learned Hand, in a recent decision, had noted the importance of a motive 
to speak the truth in admitting statements otherwise barred by the hearsay rule; (2) the 
requirement of an absence of motive to misrepresent did not create an unworkable 
standard, for like all questions of degree, it did not leave "the extent of the disqualifying 
motive under§ 695 at large." For Frank, it was clear that the statute did not permit the 
introduction of accident reports "where the primary purpose of the employer, obvious 
from the circumstances, in ordering those accidents is to use them in litigation involving 
those accidents"; 138 (3) the railroad never argued that the presence of the Massachusetts 
Utilities Commision representative made the report admissible as a public record, 
although in dictum Frank declared this a futile effort; 139 and ( 4) the death of engineer 
McDermott before trial made no legal difference. There existed no common law 
132. !d. at 987. These quotes are in the reverse of Frank's order. 
133. !d. at 986. Frank then quoted extensively from the COMMIITRE REPORT, supra note 47, concluding 
that the "limited objective at which Congress was in fact driving" was to eliminate the onerous authentication 
requirement. Hoffman, 129 F.2d at 987. This material was added to the opinion after it was first released. 
134. Frank apparently did not share this assumption, for he used a classic appeal to authority for the 
correctness of the Lutz decision, noting that it was "unanimous," written by Judge Lehman, "who had previously 
indicated that the regular entry exception ought to be liberally construed," and joined by Judge Cardozo, "who 
had not only written in a similar vein, but was also a member of the Legal Research Committee of the 
Commonwealth Fund, which sponsored the Model Act." Hoffman, 129 F.2d at 990 (footnotes omitted). 
135. Among the differences between the two cases were that, apparently unlike the bystanders in Lutz, 
the motorman in Needle possessed personal knowledge of the accident and "was probably under a duty to state 
the facts to the investigating policeman." !d. For my criticism of this interpretation, see infra text 
accompanying notes 191-206. 
136. Hoffman, 129 F.2d at 991. 
137. !d. at 993. 
138. !d. The Supreme Court relied on this formulation of Frank's decision in affirming the Second 
Circuit decision. "In short, it is manifest that in this case those reports are not for the systematic conduct of the 
enterprise as a railroad business. . . . [T]hese reports are calculated for use essentially in the court, not in the 
business. Their primary utility is in litigating, not in railroading." Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 114 
(1943). 
139. Hoffman, 129 F.2d at 993-94. 
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exception to hearsay based on the death before trial of the declarant, 140 and the reform 
statute was worded without regard to the availability of the maker of the statement. 
Additionally, Rule 503(a) of the ALI's Model Code of Evidence, which permitted the 
introduction of hearsay statements upon a showing of the declarant's unavailability, was, 
as Frank noted, merely "a proposed statute," which "gives courts no authority." 141 Thus 
closed, the exclusion of the engineer's statement did not constitute error. 142 
Clark wrote a blistering, and blustery, dissent. Because the decision "seems to me 
directly opposed to the intent of the statute, as shown by its plain terms as well as its 
history and background," and because the decision "originates a process of restrictive 
interpretation of the statute which we have hitherto unanimously repudiated," 143 Clark 
dissented. Above all, Clark noted, "zeal against reform is as much to be guarded against 
as zeal for reform. " 144 
After quoting pertinent parts of the statute, Clark noted that the engineer's statement 
was "direct relevant testimony of the kind which any court of justice ought to desire to 
admit. " 145 Not only was the fear of a motive to misrepresent "a reason which went out of 
favor a century ago," but "if the turning point is the degree of possible motivation, then 
we have a hopelessly unfair subjective test depending upon the intial brusque reactions 
of the trier." 146 As for the argument that creating a record for use in a lawsuit made it 
140. This is why Appleton, unsuccessfully, and later Thayer, successfully, suggested reforming the mles 
to admit a statement made by one who died before trial. Frank did not note the Massachusetts law, originally 
passed in 1898 at Thayer's behest, which permitted the introduction of hearsay statements made by persons who 
had died before trial, as long as the statement was made in good faith before commencement of the litigation. 
See MASS GEN. L. ch. 233, § 65 (Ter. ed., 1932). Because the case was tried in federal court, all "procedural" 
rules, including all "procedural" rules of evidence, were based on federal, not state, law. See Erie Ry. Co. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Had the case been tried in Massachusetts, the statement might have been 
admissible under Massachusetts law. Cf. Nagle v. Boston & N. St. Ry., 73 N.E. 1019 (1905) (holding 
admissible a self-serving statement of a motorman offered by his estate in the action arising from the conduct 
which the statement favorably explained). 
141. Hoffman, 129 F.2d at 995. 
142. Both of the other two claims of evidentiary error were troublesome as well, although reversal was 
not required. The decision of the trial judge 'permitting the plaintiff to introduce into evidence a statement 
written by a witness before trial if defense counsel requested to peruse it was error, but not reversible error, for 
two reasons. One reason was waiver, for Brumley had not requested the trial court to certify the statement to 
the court of appeals, so it was not in the record. The second reason was that Brumley, representing the same 
party in a case two years earlier, had successfully argued in favor of the rule he was now complaining about! 
/d. at 997-98. (This part of Frank's opinion is noteworthy for his facility in citing Santayana, Vaihinger, 
Montaigne, Maitland, Henry Maine, Roger Bacon and Herbert Spencer, among others, in a mere two pages). 
The refusal of the trial court to permit a defense witness to testify to certain observations made by him was 
apparently not in error because the conditions about which the witness was to testify were not "identical" or 
"comparable" (Frank uses both standards) to the circumstances at the time of the accident. /d. at 998. 
143. /d. at 999 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
144. /d. 
145. /d. 
146. /d. at 1000. Clark reiterated this point at the end of his dissent: "Stress is laid on the existence of 
a powerful motive to misrepresent; but what constitutes such a motive is left at large, seemingly to the hasty 
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unreliable, Clark noted that the Second Circuit had already rejected that in United States 
v. Mortimer, 147 and suggested that "the purpose and the value of records were their use in 
future disputes-to prevent many, to settle others."148 Most importantly to Clark, the 
majority's narrow interpretation of the business records reform statute was flawed because 
it failed to recognize "what the trend of the times is,"149 a trend of liberal interpretation of 
the rules of evidence. 
B. The Dispute Among Frank, Clark and Morgan 
At about the same time Frank was soliciting advice from Morgan, he was doing the 
same with the other members of the Second Circuit, Senior Circuit Judge150 Learned 
Hand, 151 Learned's cousin Augustus Hand, 152 and Harrie Chase. 153 From Frank's 
appointment in May 1941, until Learned Hand's retirement in 1951, the membership of 
the court remained the same. During that time, the court's reputation as the second most 
important court in the country was solidified. 154 However, as one scholar of the Second 
Circuit has noted, "From not long after Jerome Frank took his seat on the Second Circuit 
discretion of the trier, in the midst of a case." /d. at 1002. 
147. 118 F.2d 266, cert. denied, 314 U.S. 616 (1941). In Mortimer, decided a little over a year before 
Hoffman, the Second Circuit permitted the government to introduce several charts showing defaults by 
defendants of mortgaged properties, even though the charts were made in preparation for the trial. Id. at 270. 
The decision was written by Judge Clark for a panel that included Learned and Gus Hand. Because his 
conclusion was not solely based on the fact that the statement "was made after litigation was imminent," Frank 
considered Mortimer distinguishable. Hoffman, 129 F.2d at 991-92. Clark also noted that the decision of the 
majority "sets aside quite peremptorily the reasoning of several unanimous decisions of this court." Hoffman, 
129 F.2d at 999 (citing, in addition to Mortimer, Hunter v. Derby Foods, Inc., 110 F.2d 970 (2d Cir. 1940). 
(death certificate of coroner indicating death from ptomaine poisoning), Ulm v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 115 
F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1940), reh 'g denied, 117 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 567 (194i) (hospital 
records offered by defendant to prove plaintiffs injury a result of drug use); and Reed v. Order of United 
Commercial Travelers, 123 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1941) (hospital record of diagnosis of plaintiff indcating "still 
app-arently well under influence of alcohol") (cases in the order given by the court)). In each of these cases, 
Clark was a member of the panel, and in each case the court found the business record was admissible under the 
federal business records statute. In addition to his opinion in Mortimer, Clark also wrote both opinions in Ulm. 
Frank was a member only of the panel that decided Reed, a per curiam opinion. Frank believed all of these cases 
were distinguishable, either because there existed no "impelling motives to misrepresent" or because the records 
involved in those cases were more "trustworthy," or because the Second Circuit followed Lutz or failed to 
distinguish (or cite) Needle. Hoffman, 129 F.2d at 991-92. 






/d. (footnote omitted). 
In 1948, the term "senior circuit judge" was replaced by "chief judge." SCHICK, supra note 9, at 
On Learned Hand, see GUNTHER, supra note 87. 
On Augustus Hand, see Charles Wyzanski, Augustus Noble Hand, 61 HARV. L. REV. 573 (1948). 
153. See SCHICK, supra note 9 at 26-29; JEFFREY B. MORRIS, FEDERAL JUSTICE IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
143 (1986). 
154. Wyzanski, supra note 152; Frank, supra note 88. A later appraisal by a former law clerk is Philip 
Kurland, Jerome N. Frank: Some Reflections and Recollections of a Law Clerk, 24 U. CHI. L. REv. 661 ( 1957). 
..... 
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until the retirement of Learned Hand a decade later, the outstanding feature of the court's 
\Vork-except for the decisions handed down-was the virtually uninterrupted friction 
between Judges Clark and Frank, the court's junior members."155 The actions taken by 
Frank and Clark in the Hoffman case played some role in the deterioration of their 
relationship. 
Shortly before the court's decision in Hoffman was first released, Frank and Clark 
exchanged letters accusing each other of improper action concerning the case. 156 During 
the course of writing his opinion, Frank wrote to Clark on June 22, 1942 that he had 
discussed the question with Learned and Gus. Both of them disagreed with me. 
I, therefore, suggested that I ascertain how Harrie felt; I said to Learned and Gus 
that, if four of the six of us agreed with you, I felt it unwise that Tom and I 
should decide the question. Learned said No. 157 
Frank then claimed that after he and Clark discussed the matter with the Hands, Clark sent 
his dissent to them, which forced Frank to "show Gus mine." In Frank's view, Gus's 
reaction was, "He had previously felt the evidence admissible; my opinion made him less 
sure." Frank also told Harrie Chase about "both sides" and Harrie's "inclination was 
toward my views of the question."158 Clark, a supporter of en bane decisionmaking, 
responded: "Under the circumstances ... I do not believe it is proper to say that Gus has 
shifted ground or that Harrie has passed upon the matter. All that it is possible to say is 
155. SCHICK, supra note 9, at 219. 
156. See Letter from Jerome Frank to Charles E. Clark (June 22, 1942); Letter from Charles E. Clark to 
Jerome Frank (June 23, 1942) (Frank Papers, supra note 110, at Conference Memoranda File, Box 92, Folder 
766). Clark, who did most of his work in New Haven, apparently preferred written exchanges to face-to-face 
conversations, in large part because he did not consider himself a felicitous debater. As noted above, Frank was 
a delightful, combative and persuasive conversationalist. But Clark apparently decided to try to see Frank 
regarding their disputes over Hoffman and the Corning Glass cases. See Letter from Charles E. Clark to Jerome 
Frank (July 1, 1942) (Frank Papers, supra note 110, at Box 120, Folder 1158) ("I stopped in to see you after our 
conference Monday, but we did not get through until late and you had gone."). 
157. Letter from Jerome Frank to Charles E. Clark (June 22, 1942) (Frank Papers, supra note 110, at 
Conference Memoranda File, Box 92, Folder 766). See also Letter from Jerome Frank to Charles E. Clark (July 
6, 1942) (Frank Papers, supra note 110, at Box 120, Folder 1158), in which Frank writes: 
As I've told you before, I then said to Gus and Learned (before you knew anything about their 
views) that I thought I should ascertain how Harrie would view the matter and that, if he agreed with 
you, the decision should go your way, as then Tom and I would be a minority of two out of six. 
Learned said, No. Then, when you came to town, you, Learned, Gus and I discussed the matter at 
lunch and Learned said he was opposed to a six-judge court. Then you sent Gus and Learned your 
dissent. Only then did I give Gus my draft of opinion. He said it made him somewhat less sure of 
his earlier disagreement with me. Learned didn't see my opinion (unless he's read it since it's been 
printed) and I don't know his reaction. I chatted with Harrie who said he thought he'd probably 
agree with me, but I told him to wait until my and your opinions were published. 
Learned Hand opposed en bane decisions. SCHICK, supra note 9, at I 02, I 05. 
158. Letter from Jerome Frank to Charles E. Clark (June 22, 1942) (Frank Papers, supra note II 0, at 
Conference Memoranda File, Box 92, Folder 766). 
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that the court is seriously divided on the question, and it is one which certainly ought to 
have gone before the full court. " 159 
By asserting that Chase's "inclination" tended toward Frank and Swan's position, 
Frank was now able to claim he was no longer in a position of arguing a minority view. 
The additional claim that Augustus Hand was "less sure" of his initial position made 
Frank's position even more tenable. For someone as sensitive to criticism as Frank, his 
efforts to informally persuade the members not on the panel to his position may have been 
important, particularly because he knew that the criticism voiced in Clark's dissent was 
likely to be joined by Morgan. 
Part of Frank's problem concerning his emendation of the business records exception 
was that both Hands served as members of the Advisory Committee to the Model Code 
of Evidence, 160 which Committee proposed a business records rule "based upon the Act 
recommended by the Commonwealth Fund Committee, which has been enacted by 
Congress."161 This was, of course, the Act at issue in Hoffman v. Palmer. Additionally, 
Frank's predecessor on the Second Circuit, Robert P. Patterson, was also a member of the 
Committee on Evidence. 162 Finally (and speculatively), the fact that the case came from 
Abruzzo's court would not have aided Frank's cause, although the practice of the Second 
Circuit at this time was not to name the trial judge in its opinion, 163 and it is unclear 
whether the Hands were aware that Abruzzo was the trial judge. 
Apparently looking for support, Clark sent the slip opinion to Morgan. Morgan 
angrily wrote to Frank: 
Charlie Clark has sent me the opinions in the Hoffman case. I must say that 
you have done a fine job in statutory emasculation. If we should have a few 
more decisions like yours construing the business entry statute, we should get 
back almost to the common law rule. The idea that a business entry is 
inadmissible because the entrant had a motive to misstate, is the idea which 
made the English common law courts reject all business entries except when 
made by a servant in the course of duty. It played almost no part in the 
development of the modern rule in the United States, and was not regarded as an 
- essential element of the rule in the great majority of cases. Every business entry 
charging another with an obligation to the entrant or to the entrant's employer 
has_ some of the characteristics of a self-serving statment, but I do not want to 
argue the matter with you. I merely want to point out that in emphasizing this 
uncertain element in the common law rule, you have totally disregarded the 
language of the statute. The decision is all the more surprising to me coming, 
as it does, from a man whom I had always regarded as a liberal thinker in the 
law. Perhaps your liberalism is confined to substantive matter and perhaps your 
159. Letter from Charles E. Clark to Jerome Frank (June 23, 1942) (Frank Papers, supra note 110, at 
Conference Memoranda File, Box 92, Folder 766). 





/d. at 271 (comment to Rule 514, entitled "Business Entries and the Like"). 
/d. at III. 
SCHICK, supra note 9, at 138-39. 
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faith in the common law processes of adjudication does not equal your faith in 
the administrative process. 164 
Frank's response to Morgan's one-page letter was an eight-page missive. 165 
Beginning with "[i]f a judge says something with which E.M. Morgan disagrees, he's a 
reactionary, who doesn't take the judicial process seriously, and who is a careless, 
unscholarly, \Vorker," 166 Frank continued with several different defenses of both the 
decision and his actions. He became a judge only because he took the judicial process 
seriously, and although there was room for "judicial legislation," "we'll give the judiciary 
a black eye" "if we judges go to construing statutes so as to achieve results we like, 
\Vithout regard to the intention ofCongress." 167 Even though Frank believed "the hearsay 
rule should probably be abolished," it was his duty to follow Congress's intentions, which 
were ascertainable from the Senate Judiciary Comtnittee Report on the business records 
statute. 168 As the author of the Commonwealth Fund Committee proposal, on which the 
federal business records act was based, Morgan was probably the '"worst person'" to 
construe the statute. And Frank noted that Morgan himself had published nothing which 
"hinted" that the statute (or its predecessor reform proposals) was intended to go beyond 
eliminating the common law requirement that each entry maker authenticate his entry. 
Frank then cited Wigmore's Treatise for support that the motive to misrepresent was 
clearly a part of the history of the rule concerning the admissibility of business records. 
Penultimately, Frank used his abhorrence of the jury trial to defend his interpretation: 
"Except in criminal cases, I think the jury should be eliminated. It is, to my mind, the 
164. Letter from Edmund M. Morgan to Jerome Frank (July 3, 1942) (Frank Papers, supra note II 0, at 
Box 61, Folder 631; Morgan Papers, supra note 106, at Box 5, Folder 1 0). Morgan also wrote a short note that 
day to Clark, telling him that he had also written Frank and that, "you took him to town in your dissent, and I 
am puzzled to know why Tom Swan agreed with him." Letter from Edmund M. Morgan to Charles E. Clark 
(July 3, 1942) (Morgan Papers, supra note 106, at Box 5, Folder 10). 
165. Letter from Jerome Frank to Edmund M. Morgan (July 8, 1942) (Frank Papers, supra note 110, at 
Box 61, Folder 631; Morgan Papers, supra note 106, at Box 5, Folder 1 0). All quotations in the paragraph that 
follow are taken from this letter. 
166. In the final version of the Hoffman opinion, Frank wrote,"[ o ]ur decision here is no less liberal than 
the decisions of other state or federal courts interpreting the Model Act." Hoffman, 129 F.2d at 993. This 
passage was written before Frank received the July 3 letter from Morgan, but I believe it is reasonable to 
speculate that this was Frank's attempt to justify to Morgan, with whom he had earlier corresponded, as well 
as to himself(and maybe Clark) that he was not a "reactionary," but remained a "liberal." 
167. Frank continued: "And we so-called 'liberals' ought to be singularly careful in that respect. We've 
beefed about the way the 'reactionaries' on the bench killed off legislation by excessive use of judi.cial 
legislation. We ought not now use the same devices with reverse English." That liberals feared being charged 
with excessive use of judicial legislation after the constitutional revolution of 1937 is discussed in Michael 
Ariens, A Thrice-Told Tale, or Felix the Cat, 107 HARV. L. REv. 620, 667-74 (1994). 
168. Frank extensively quoted the Report to Morgan, and noted that he had failed to discuss the Report 
when defining "regular course of business" in his initial opinion. Possibly because of Morgan's response to 
Frank, the Hoffman opinion was revised and when released for official publication on July 31, 1942, included 
the information from the Senate Judiciary Committee Report in order to show the intent of Congress concerning 
the business records statute. See Hoffman, 129 F.2d at 987-90. 
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worst possible means of factfinding. More than any other factor, it tends to emphasize the 
trial as a mere game ofwits."169 Special verdicts might bring some "sense" to the "jury 
system," but opposition to this, as well as to 'juries of experts" led to "a hopeless mess." 
To prove that he was not a stickler for antiquated rules of evidence, including hearsay 
rules, Frank concluded, "As emotions-and not evidence or the court's 
instructions-determine verdicts, without possibility of control, I see little harm in letting 
in anything. For, the more you let in, the more there is for the jury to disregard." Finally, 
in a postscript, Frank again made an appeal to authority, noting that Cardozo joined the 
unanimous opinion of the New Y_ork Court of Appeals in Johnson v. Lutz, and asserted, 
as he had with Clark, support from the other Second Circuit judges: "[D]on 't be too sure 
that the judges of this court, other than Charlie, wouldn't go along with the majority 
opinion in Hoffman v. Palmer." 
In a brief response, 170 Morgan disclaimed calling Frank "either a reactionary or a 
fool," but reiterated his belief that the "opinion seemed to me to over-emphasize the 
statements in business entry cases and to rely upon what seemed to me outworn 
cautionary generalizations instead of accepting the general attitude of the forward-looking 
courts." 171 Morgan promised a longer reply, which was sent on August 15, 1942. 172 
Morgan again criticized Frank for "taking the traditionally conservative attitude toward 
procedural reform," unlike the "forward-looking" approach Frank had "as an 
administrative officer and on question[ s] of social policy." Morgan agreed that the author 
of a statute is "the last man to interpret it," but still thought that a reasonable interpretation 
of the Act was broader than Frank's interpretation. After disagreeing with Frank's 
recitation of the history of the phrase "regular course of business" and its relation to the 
absence of a motive to misrepresent, he wrote, "I do not think as badly of the jury as you 
do, or as you think that I do." For Morgan, although the jury was "a poor instrument for 
fact finding" in complex commercial cases, it was "likely to reach a socially just result" 
in tort cases. But "sensible decisions" were less likely as long as the rules of evidence · 
169. He then cited as support for this statement parts of his Law and the Modern Mind. Frank did not 
make clear why the jury was helpful to the criminally accused, particularly when it based its decision on 
"emotions." In his 1949 book Courts on Trial, Frank was more equivocal about the jury in criminal cases. 
JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 136 ( 1949). 
170. Letter from Edmund M. Morgan to Jerome Frank (July I 0, 1942) (Frank Papers, supra note II 0, 
at Box 61, Folder 631; Morgan Papers, supra note I 06, at Box 5, Folder I 0). All quotations following are taken 
from this letter. 
171. Morgan professed "great doubts" whether the report would have altered the jury's verdict, and was 
more concerned that an "elaborate opinion by the Second Circuit, which is probably the best court in the 
country," gave life to a discredited approach to the rules of evidence. He concluded: "Let me assure you, Jeny, 
I am really flattered that you would pay so much attention to my opinion on a question ofthis sort." In response, 
Frank sent an opinion that he asked Morgan to read, and wrote, "It will serve to show that I'm not a hopeless 
reactionary in the field of so-called adjective law." Letter from Jerome Frank to Edmund M. Morgan (July 15, 
1942) (Frank Papers, supra note 110, at Box 61, Folder 631; Morgan Papers, supra note 106, at Box 5, Folder 
10). 
172. Letter from Edmund M. Morgan to Jerome Frank (August 15, 1942) (Frank Papers, supra note II 0, 
at Box 61, Folder 631; Morgan Papers, supra note I 06, at Box 5, Folder I 0). This letter was three pages in 
length. All quotations following are from this letter. 
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\Vere based on "the notion that a lawsuit is a contest between adversaries who can limit 
the issues .... The less of a game you make of a lawsuit, the better job a jury will do." 173 
As might be expected, Frank gave it one more try. 174 After informing Morgan that 
he was not "unaware" that the "'intent of the legislature is, at times,' a fiction," Frank 
again argued that there was no need to rely on the fiction in Hoffman, for Congress meant 
what it said. Further, Frank's evaluation of pre-statutory precedent in the Second Circuit 
proved that the "element of motive" played a role in the history of the common law rule. 
Morgan's response was brief: "Thanks a lot for your letter of August 25. I suppose we 
might as well agree at this point to disagree." 175 
In the November 1942 issue of the Harvard Law Review, a note about the case was 
published. 176 Initialled "J.M.M." for Morgan's colleague and Cases on Evidence co-
author John M. Maguire, who was also the Assistant Reporter to the Model Code of 
Evidence Committee, the note began with a summary of the case. Maguire then 
complained, "Transgressors tread no harder way than do those who seek to liberalize the 
law of evidence."177 After years of effort, reformers accomplished only little change, in 
part because "an ameliorative act may find itself more or less strait-jacketed by strict 
judicial interpretation." Hoffman v. Palmer was another "manifestation of aversion to 
change."178 
For the next several years, apparently in an effort to regain Morgan's favor, Frank 
occasionally sent copies of his opinions to Morgan. In November 1943, Frank sent 
Morgan his opinion in Zell v. American Seating Company, 179 and in the cover letter wrote: 
"Perhaps you 'II consider the enclosed opinion ... as some indication that I'm not a 100% 
173. Morgan's response to Frank's claim that his hands were tied (Holmes's "can't helps") was to the 
point: "In short, Jerry, humility is a gown which fits you and your court very badly." Morgan concluded: 
"Notwithstanding this long letter, and my continued disagreement with the Hoffman opinion and with much in 
Law and the Modern Mind, I continue to be very fond of you, and am rejoiced in your progress in the public 
service." See supra note 172. 
174. Letter from Jerome Frank to Edmund M. Morgan (August 25, 1942) (Frank Papers, supra note 110, 
at Box 61, Folder 631; Morgan Papers, supra note I 06, at Box 6, Folder I). This was merely a four page letter. 
All quotations following are from this letter. -
175. Letter from Edmund M. Morgan to Jerome Frank (August 31, 1942) (Frank Papers, supra note 110, 
at Box 61, Folder 631; Morgan Papers, supra note I 06, at Box 6, Folder I). 
176. J.M.M., Note, Hoffman v. Palmer: Admissibility at Common Law and Under the Model Act of 
Business Records Made by a Third Party with Incentive to Misrepresent, 56 HARV. L. REV. 458 (1942). 
177. /d. at 459. 
178. /d. Nearly two decades later, in a symposium issue of the Vanderbilt Law Review honoring Eddie 
Morgan, Maguire contributed an essay on the "thicket" of the "hearsay system," and while praising reform of 
the law concerning the admissibility of business records, remarked, "Such wet blankets as Palmer v. Hoffman, 
318 U.S. I 09 (1943), are fortunately rare." John M. Maguire, The Hearsay System: Around and Through the 
Thicket, 14 VAND. L. REV. 741,774 n.l04 (1961). 
179. 138 F.2d 641 (2nd Cir. 1943). Frank's opinion in Zell is a fascinating, and discursive, essay about 
the history of the parol evidence rule and its limited value and application in modern litigation. A by-product 
of this essay was the court's conclusion that the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment was 
erroneously based on its broad interpretation of the parol evidence rule. 
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reactionary." 180 In the next two years, Frank sent his opinions in Buckminster 's Estate v. 
Commissioner, 181 and Doehler Metal Furniture Co. v. United States, 182 remarking in the 
cover letter included with the latter case, "In the enclosed, I've tried to learn from the best 
minds." 183 
In 1946, Morgan discussed the developments in the law of evidence during World 
War 11. 184 Near the end of this lengthy survey, Morgan criticized both Frank's opinion in 
Hoffman and Justice Douglas's opinion for the Supreme Court in Palmer v. Hoffman. 185 
Morgan's criticism of Frank's opinion was relatively mild: "The least that can be said is 
that [Frank's] approach to the interpretation of such an enactment is extremely 
unfortunate." 186 Morgan was much more critical of the Supreme Court's opinion, in 
180. Letter from Jerome Frank to Edmund M. Morgan (November 19, 1943) (Frank Papers, supra note 
110, at Box 61, Folder 631). If Frank was asking to be forgiven, Morgan was wiJiing to accommodate. But 
Morgan was not going to forget: "You did not need to send me this opinion to convince me that you are not 
100% reactionary. I know full well your liberal tendency, but I stiJI can't get over the shock of your distorting 
the statute and excluding a statement made in the course of duty in the Hoffman case." Letter from Edmund M. 
Morgan to Jerome Frank (November 23, 1943) (Frank Papers, supra note 110, at Box 61, Folder 631 ). Frank's 
plaintive reply: "You have a hard heart. Isn't it an extenuating fact that nine Supreme Court justices similarly 
'distorted' the statute?" Letter from Jerome Frank to Edmund M. Morgan (November 27, 1943) (Frank Papers, 
supra note 110, at Box 61, Folder 631 ). 
181. 147 F.2d 331 (2d Cir. 1944). At the outset of his opinion, Frank held admissible pursuant to the 
federal business records statute a hospital record containing the conclusion that the taxpayer suffered a cerebral 
hemorrhage. Frank then criticized New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir. 1944), which held 
inadmissible hospital records containing information concerning the insured's death (the issue was whether the 
death was suicide or accident). "We do not agree with the way in which Hoffman v. Palmer was interpreted in 
the Taylor case." Buckminster 's Estate, 147 F.2d at 334. Morgan also criticized Taylor, and cited Frank's 
opinion in Buckminster's Estate for support. See Edmund M. Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 1941-45, 59 HARV. 
L. REV. 481,565 (1946) ("[The Taylor Court's] reliance on the opinion of Judge Frank in the Palmer case seems 
to have been in error, for the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit expressly disapproved the Taylor case in 
Buckminster 's Estate v. Commissioner.") (footnote omitted). Interestingly, the opinion in Taylor was written 
by another famous legal realist, Thurman Arnold, then an Associate Judge of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia, and also a critic of the rationality of trials. See THURMAN ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS 
OF GOVERNMENT ch. 8 ( 1935) (naming chapter "Trial by Combat"); Thurman Arnold, The Role of Substantive 
Law and Procedure in the Legal Process, 45 HARV. L. REV. 617 (1932); THURMAN ARNOLD AND FLEMING 
JAMES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRIALS JUDGMENTS AND APPEALS (1936). 
182. 149 F.2d 130, 137 n.IO (2nd Cir. 1945) (citing with approval Morgan's work on the law of 
presumptions). 
183. Letter from Jerome Frank to Edmund M. Morgan (May 9, 1945) (Frank Papers, supra note 110, at 
Box 61, Folder 631). 
184. Morgan, supra note 181. 
185. Morgan, supra note 181, at 565-67. 
186. Morgan, supra note 181, at 565-66. Morgan then opined that Frank erroneously assumed "the 
inherent validity of ... the common law instead of regarding the entire hearsay rule as an exception to the 
principle that a trier of fact should have the advantage of considering all available relevant data." Morgan, supra 
note 181, at 566. 
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which the business records statute "fared much more badly."187 After criticizing 
Douglas's interpretation of the historical basis of the business records statute, and his 
wrongly "taking judicial notice" of the fact that the reports were not part of the business 
of the railroad, he concluded: "It is said that James B. Thayer once remarked in effect that 
the greatness of the Supreme Court was not revealed in its decisions on questions of 
evidence. Elaboration would be superfluous."188 
V. THE MEANING OF IT ALL 
A. The Opinion 
Two aspects of Frank's opinion deserve some extended comment: 189 first, his 
reliance on Needle v. New York Railways Corporation; 190 and second, his apparent refusal 
to assess the statement made by the engineer McDermott. 
1. Needle v. New York Railways Corporation.-In Frank's opinion, the federal 
business records statute was borrowed from the New York act. Consequently, to 
understand the meaning of the federal act, the court was required to ascertain the meaning 
of the New York act, and the meaning of the New York act was dependent on judicial 
interpretation of that act. Even assuming that one accepts the first premise, 191 why rely 
on Needle, an intermediate appellate decision, as the proper case to interpret the New 
York act, rather than the much more famous case of Johnson v. Lutz, 192 decided by the 
New York Court of Appeals, New York's highest court? 
187. Morgan, supra note 181, at 566. Eighteen months after the Supreme Court released its Palmer 
opinion, Morgan wrote to Douglas complaining, "Now see what you went and done in the Palmer case, New 
York Life v. Taylor, 143 F.2d 14!" Letter from Edmund M. Morgan to William 0. Douglas (August 31, 1944) 
(Edmund M. Morgan Papers, Vanderbilt University) [hereina~er Morgan Papers, Vanderbilt University] (copy 
on file with author). The Morgan Papers at Vanderbilt are not yet archived by box and folder number. Douglas 
replied, "It is tough to be held responsible for all progeny of a case. What principle of liability is that?" Letter 
from William 0. Douglas to Edmund M. Morgan (November 1, 1944) (Morgan Papers, Vanderbilt University), 
supra. 
188. Morgan, supra note 181, at 567. Five years later, apparently at the request of Charlie Clark, Morgan 
sent a reprint of this and other evidence articles to him. Clark then wrote a thank-you letter, concluding, "And 
of course I love your criticisms of Palmer v. Hoffman." Letter from Charles E. Clark to Edmund M. Morgan 
(September 17, 1951) (Morgan Papers, Vanderbilt University, supra note 187). 
189. Frank's interpretation of the phrase "regular course of business" was subject to a searing comment 
in J.M.M., Note, supra note 176, at 462-65. 
190. 237 N.Y.S. 547 (1929). 
191. It seems at least as accurate to say that both the federal and New York acts were borrowed from the 
Commonwealth Fund proposal, which would thus require some understanding of the intent of the framers of 
that proposal, in particular Morgan and Wigmore. Judge Clark had so interpreted the federal act in 1940 in Ulm 
v. Moore-McCormack Lines Inc., 115 F.2d 492,495 (2d Cir. 1940) ("[T]his act did not come from the New 
York statute. Both in fact derive from the activities of a committee of experts on the law of evidence appointed 
by the Commonwealth Fund .... "). Frank ignored Clark's assertion, see Hoffman, 129 F.2d at 985, and later 
attempted to defuse this problem through his explanation of Morgan and Wigmore's views of Needle. Hoffman, 
129 F.2d at 991. 
192. 170N.E. 517 (N.Y. 1930). 
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As Frank noted, both Morgan and Wigmore had criticized the Lutz decision. 193 But 
this was of no consequence, for Frank claimed that "we may, arguendo, assume [Lutz], 
to have been wrong. . . . [I]t has no bearing whatever on the case at bar."194 Instead, 
because the crucial precedent was Needle, the criticism of Lutz by Morgan and Wigmore 
was of no consequence. 
In both Needle and Lutz, the dispute concerned the admissibility of a police blotter, 
in both cases the evidence was offered by the defendant as evidence exculpating the 
defendant, and in both cases the information recorded on the blotter was based on hearsay 
statements from third parties. And, finally, both cases were tort actions alleging negligent 
conduct on the part of an employee of the defendant. Frank noted only one factual 
difference, which he believed made Lutz "clearly distinguishable from the Needle case."195 
In Needle, "the report was excluded because of the motorman's probable bias even though 
(a) he was, of course, familiar with the facts, (b) he was probably under a duty to state the 
facts to the investigating policeman, and (c) the policeman, acting officially, was 
disinterested."196 Therefore, Needle turned upon the issue of bias, rather than, as in Lutz, 
the issues of either the lack of personal knowledge of witnesses, 197 or lack of duty to 
report their observations. These differences, as Frank noted in his opinion, were 
"crucial," for Needle thus demonstrated that the motive to misrepresent was a crucial 
underpinning of the business records exception to hearsay. 
The problem with Frank's analysis is that it "plays fast and loose" with the Appellate 
Division's opinion in Needle. Yes, the Needle court did note that the "interested 
motorman ... had every reason to give[] a biased and false report," and Frank accurately 
quoted this part of the court's opinion. The first half of the statement, however, which 
Frank omitted from the Hoffman opinion, stated: 
In the case at bar, to show that this record is inadmissible, it is only necessary to 
point out that the statements made to the policeman, upon which he based his 
report, were not made by any person in the regular course of any business, but, 
on the contrary, the report of the policeman was made upon the irresponsible 
193. Hoffman, 129 F.2d at 990 & n.27. 
194. !d. at 990. 
195. !d. 
196. !d. 
197. In Lutz, the Court of Appeals merely stated: "It does not appear [from the police blotter] whether 
they saw the accident and stated to him [the police officer] what they knew, or stated what some other persons 
had told them." Lutz, 170 N.E. at 518. Frank interpreted Lutz as holding it error to admit: 
a written hearsay report made by A who is under a duty to make it, where ( 1) A has no personal 
knowledge of the facts and (2) bases his report on the statement ofB who himself has no knowledge 
of the facts and (3) who, not in the regular course of business ofB's business, states what was told 
him by C who (4) had personal knowledge of the facts but did not state them toBin the regular 
course ofB's or C's business. 
Hoffman, 129 F.2d at 990, n.28. Element (2) of Frank's construction is not necessarily part of the Lutz 
holding, but simply indicates the Lutz court's awareness of another possible gap in the proof. A lay witness is 
rarely permitted to testify without personal knowledge of the testimonial matter. See FED. R. Evm. 602. 
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gossip of bystanders and the even more unreliable conclusion of the interested 
motorman. 198 
With the addition of this language to the "holding" in Needle quoted by Frank, at least 
three possibilities emerge. First, the interested motorman was not believed by the court 
to have been under any duty to speak with the police officer, for the statements in the 
blotter "were not made by any person in the regular c.ourse of any business."199 This 
undermines Frank's conclusion that Needle was distinguishable from Lutz because the 
conductor "was probably under a duty to state the facts to the investigating policeman."200 
Second, the court was as concerned with "the irresponsible gossip of bystanders," that is, 
with the witnesses' lack of personal knowledge, as with the fact that these were out-of-
court statements offered as true, and thus hearsay. This again undercuts any factual 
distinction between Lutz and Needle. Third, the court may have considered the 
"conclusion" of the motorman an opinion rather than a statement of fact, and thus 
inadmissible because lay witnesses were limited to testifying to facts. 201 
With Needle distinguished from Lutz, and thus the proper authority to interpret the 
federal business records act, Frank then turned to Morgan and Wigmore's views of 
Needle. Frank first noted that Morgan had never publicly criticized Needle. 202 Although 
Wigmore had criticized Needle, he had "overlooked entirely the crucial 
fact-differentiating Needle sharply from Lutz-that among 'the various persons' in 
Needle was the highly 'interested motorman. '"203 Consequently, Frank could make the 
remarkable assertion that "[i]t is difficult to believe that, had [Wigmore] noted that 
distinguishing factor, he would have criticized the decision."204 Needle thus stood both 
unbloody and unbowed. 
Frank lastly suggested another reason for relying on Needle: Because Needle "was 
decided before the Court of Appeals decided Johnson v. Lutz ... there can be no doubt 
that the court which decided the Needle case ... would be even more ready to exclude the 
company's document here."205 Indeed, the Needle court did not decide "because of the 
reasons given in the Lutz case, and criticized by Wigmore and Morgan, but because of the 
198. Needle, 237 N.Y.S. at 549. 
199. !d. 
200. Hoffman, 129 F.2d at 990. 
201. The court noted earlier in its opinion that the police blotter "contained the statement, 'Responsibility 
Pedestrian,'" which was based in part on the motorman's statements. The court may have believed that the 
statement "Responsibility Pedestrian" was an inadmissible conclusion of the officer, a lay witness without 
personal knowledge of the facts. Needle, 237 N.Y.S. at 548. 
202. Hoffman, 129 F.2d at 991. 
203. !d. 
204. !d. I doubt it, for Wigmore was critical not just of Lutz but of any judicial interpretation limiting 
the admissiblity of business records under the reform acts, and Wigmore championed this reform proposal as 
a member of the Commonwealth Fund committee and as chariman of the ABA reform committee. There is no 
private correspondence between Wigmore and Frank in the Wigmore papers at Northwestern, and I know of no 
published criticism of Hoffman by Wigmore before he died. 
205. Hoffman, 129 F.2d at 990. 
1995] HEARSAY REFORM 217 
existence of that strong motive to misrepresent."206 Again, Frank's statement is true but 
inaccurate. Yes, it was true that Needle was decided before the New York Court of 
Appeals decided Lutz. However, Needle was decided after the Appellate Division 
decided Lutz. Not only did the Appellate Division decide Lutz before Needle, the case 
was quoted in its entirety in Needle and was the only precedential case cited by the Needle 
court in support of its decision.207 For Frank to suggest that Lutz and Needle were 
distinguishable on grounds that the latter did not rely on the former stretches credulity. 
2. The Engineer's Statement.-Possibly the only thing missing from Frank's 
exhaustive opinion is the text of the statement at the heart of the dispute.208 The format 
of the statement, a series of questions by an Assistant Superintendent of the Railroad 
answered by the engineer, could have suggested a misrepresentation of the facts. 
However, the statement itself refutes that suggestion. Frank's decision not to include the 
text of the statement in his opinion was made, in my view, because the statement did not 
include assertions "dripping with motivations to misrepresent" and thus did not support 
his conclusion. 
Frank made two decisions concerning his evaluation of the engineer's statement. I 
believe both were mistaken. He made a behavioral claim ·without assessing the truth of 
the claim in light of the case, and he failed to assess the statement in context. 
Not once in the opinion did Frank give an example of the bias in the statement. Frank 
apparently cared not at all about the statement itself. Because the statement was made 
after the accident, and because it was made by someone who was "very likely, in a 
probable law suit relating to that accident, to be charged with wrongdoing as a participant 
in the accident,"209 the maker was "almost certain, when making the memorandum or 
report, to be sharply affected by a desire to exculpate himself and to relieve himself or his 
en1ployer of liability."210 This is a behavioral claim.21 1 Frank gives no citation here to 
empirical work on human behavior. This claim is simply a given. As a theory of human 
nature, it may be true. And, if accepted as true and applied to law, this behavioral claim 
might have given rise to a rule requiring the trial court to assess the extent of the bias of 
~06. !d. 
207. Needle, 237 N.Y.S. at 549. Before quoting Johnson v. Lutz, 234 N.Y.S. 328 (App. Div. I929) in 
full, the Needle court stated: "This holding is also in accord with that of the Appellate Division, Second 
Department, in sustaining the exclusion of a police blotter under circumstances similar to those in the case at 
bar .... " Needle, 237 N.Y.S. at 549. The only other case cited in the entire opinion is Vosburgh v. Thayer, I2 
Johns. 461 (1815), cited as the first New York case producing a "limited 'Shop Book' rule." Needle, 237 N.Y.S. 
at 548-49. See also Note, Admissibility of Business Entries: A Comparison of the Federal and New York Rules, 
II BROOK. L. REV. 78, 85 (194I) (concluding that Needle "rel[ied] primarily" on Johnson v. Lutz); Note, 
Judicial Interpretations ofSection 374a ofthe Civil Practice Act, 4 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 271,272 (1930) (stating 
that Lutz and Needle presented situations that "were practically identical"). 
208. See supra note 117 for the text of the statement. The reader can speculate as well as I about Frank's 
reasons for not setting forth the engineer's statement. 
209. Hoffman, 129 F.2d at 991. 
210. !d. 
211. Frank is also making a behavioral claim regarding the nature in which human beings would receive 
this information. That is, he is suggesting that a human beings sitting as members of a jury could not 
understand, and thus properly discount, such a statement. 
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a particular statement offered before admitting it into evidence or admitting the evidence 
and instructing the jury to receive the statement cautiously. But Frank made no effort to 
persuade the reader that his theory of human behavior was borne out in the statement. 
Instead, he simply relied on the "fact" that the statement "by its very nature, is dripping 
with motivations to misrepresent."212 
In his 1949 book Courts on Trial, Frank wrote, "The basic aim of the courts in our 
society should, I think, be the just settlement of particular disputes, the just decision of 
specific law-suits."213 To achieve this, courts must "strive tirelessly to get as close as is 
humanly possible to the actual facts of specific court-room controversies. Courthouse 
justice is, I repeat, done at retail, not at wholesale."214 But Frank failed to heed his own 
advice. The Hoffman opinion is decided only at the wholesale level. Although Frank 
notes that the engineer's statement was given "two days after the accident,"215 he never 
ties this fact to his conclusion of the engineer's bias. To do so would require some 
evidence that the purpose of the interview was to perpetuate the engineer's testimony, and 
that requires that the railroad knew or had reason to know both that it would be sued and 
that McDermott would die before trial.216 Frank also never assessed, nor suggested that 
the trial court assess, McDermott's belief as of Friday, December 27, 1940, that his 
statement was being given at a time when an impending lawsuit was shortly to "charge" 
him with "wrongdoing." As with the motorman in Needle, McDermott's motive to 
misrepresent apparently arose immediately after the accident occurred and never 
dissipated. 
One way in which to assess McDermott's motive to misrepresent is to look at what 
he said. Before the lawsuit was a twinkling in any plaintiffs eye/17 McDermott claimed 
that the bell and whistle were sounded, and that the tender of the engine had a "good" 
back-up light attached to it. He also claimed that the back-up light was burning after the 
accident and was put out by him at some point after the accident. All of this information 
is exculpatory and thus subject to Frank's motive to misrepresent.218 However, 
McDermott also stated that he had not made a "test" of his air brakes before beginning to 
back up; that he could see out only one side of the engine; that after the accident Inez 
Hoffman was unconscious but breathing; that he did not help Howard Hoffman, who was 
212. Hoffman, 129 F .2d at 991. The quotation of the word fact earlier in the sentence is mine. 
213. FRANK, supra note 169. 
214. FRANK, supra note 169. 
215. Hoffman, 129 F.2d at 979. 
216. I speculate that, if at all possible, Brumley would have called McDermott as a witness, which would 
have vitiated any need to introduce the written statement. My speculation serves to counter Frank's view that 
in this type of case it was "the primary purpose of the employer ... to use [the statements] in litigation involving 
those accidents." /d. at 993. Additionally, unless Frank knew or suggested the likelihood that Cuineen and 
McDermott had rehearsed McDermott's "testimony" and that McDermott and the fireman Meach had rehearsed 
their stories, it is unclear how the railroad primarily intended to use McDermott's statement in any ensuing 
litigation. Meach was not cross-examined on this subject, and Cuineen was not called as a witness. 
217. Howard Hoffman was unconscious and Inez Hoffman was dead. I suppose that Hulda Hoffman, 
the owner of the Ford coupe, might have thought about a lawsuit. 
218. AIJ of this is also cumulative in the sense that similar testimony was given by the fireman Meach. 
See Record, supra note 59, at 329-39. 
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pinned against the steering wheel, out of the car; and that he was backing up at between 
fifteen and eighteen miles per hour. He also denied questioner Cuineen's suggestion that 
the car "ran into the side of the tank," and, in response to Mr. Christie of the 
Massachusetts Public Utility Commission, stated that he did not put his brakes on until 
he "was over the crossing" and that he "put on the brakes after he [Hoffman] hit." All of 
this information can be perceived as harmful to the railroad's case.219 However, because 
no lawsuit had been filed, I fail to see how McDermott could have known that the 
particular claims of negligence decided by the jury would be failure to sound bell and 
whistle, or failure to light a proper backup light, rather than say, excessive speed or failure 
to look out. 220 
Frank did not attempt to get as close to the facts as humanly possible. He chose 
rather to make broad assertions, assertions the record does not bear out. 
B. Hoffman and the Visions of Morgan and Frank. 
In the summer of 1942, when Morgan and Frank were exchanging correspondence 
about Hoffman, Frank sent Morgan eight unpublished pages of a draft of the Hoffman 
opinion.221 Frank's purpose in writing was to challenge directly the efficacy of Morgan's 
efforts to reform the rules of evidence. The result made relatively clear both the 
differences and similarities of Frank's and Morgan's visions about" law and the legal 
process. 
Morgan did not believe that the existence of the jury system fully explained the 
hearsay rule or other exclusionary rules of evidence, 222 although the existence of the jury 
was "in part responsible for a portion of the law creating and governing exceptions to the 
hearsay rule. "223 The traditional view connecting the jury with exclusionary rules of 
evidence led to the reflexive claim that hearsay reform was unnecessary or even harmful. 
Morgan's contrary view was that many exclusionary rules, including the rules on hearsay, 
were based on the mistaken (and contradictory) notions of widespread perjury, combined 
219. See supra note 117. I suppose one could argue that McDennott was intentionally throwing these 
'"harmful" facts into his statement to hide his motivation to misrepresent. Cf Williamson v. United States, 114 
S. Ct. 2431, 2435 (1994) (holding that Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3), permitting the introduction of 
statements against interest, "does not allow the admission of non-self-inculpatory statements, even ifthey are 
made within a broader narrative that is generally self-inculpatory"). 
220. In fact, the complaint did allege that defendants "ran the said locomotive and the cars attached 
thereto at a high and unlawful rate of speed at a place where it knew that special care should be exercised and 
[was negligent] in failing to keep a proper and vigilant lookout." Record, supra note 59, at 10; Complaint at 
8. These issues were not, however, submitted to the jury. 
221. Hoffman, excerpt of draft opinion, in Frank Papers, supra note 110, at Box 61, Folder 631. Frank 
requested Morgan return the draft, which he did, and thus it is found only in the Frank Papers. Much in this 
essay, and in Frank's letters to Morgan in 1942, is explored in greater depth in Frank's 1949 book, Courts on 
Trial. See FRANK, supra note 169, at 14-36, 80-102, 108-45. 
222. Edmund M. Morgan, The Jury and the Exclusionary Rules of Evidence, 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 247 
(1937). Morgan thus took issue with the work of James Bradley Thayer. See id. at 258 ("But the dictum of the 
great Thayer that the English law of evidence is 'the child of the jury' is, it is suggested with the greatest 
deference, not more than a half-truth." (footnotes omitted)). 
223. /d. at 256. 
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with the belief that exclusionary rules would prevent the jury from hearing false evidence. 
The result of the application of those rules at trial was that the trial was not a rational 
proceeding designed for the settlement of disputes between litigants. The radical reform 
of hearsay was necessary to make trials more rational. 
Frank considered the jury to be an incompetent fact-finding body largely because of 
its lack of training in the difficult "art" of fact-finding and its predilection for deciding 
cases based on emotion and sympathy, rather than the evidence. Frank believed several 
consequences flowed from this. Due in part to its lack of training, the jury was "a 
hundred times" less capable of accurately finding the facts than a judge. Because, in 
truth, the jury decided cases on emotion, 224 the exclusionary rules of evidence were 
unimportant, 225 and a relaxation of those rules would simply give the jury more to 
disregard.226 Ultimately, the preferred solution was to amend the Constitution and abolish 
the jury in civil trials. 
Both Frank and Morgan were proud to be "liberals" and "reformers." Both men were 
harsh critics of the sporting theory ofjustice.227 In this, they followed a path well trod by 
Thayer, Wigmore and Pound.228 Both desired a "rational" process for resolving disputes, 
and both believed the present system was in many respects "irrational." Finally, both 
agreed the goal of the legal system was to effectuate justice. However, their assent on 
these issues led to quite different conclusions. Morgan desired radical evidentiary reform 
liberalizing the admission of evidence. Frank desired the elimination or radical 
restructuring of the jury. 
In his draft opinion, Frank accused Morgan of"acknowledging that a jury trial is not 
and cannot be converted into a 'proceeding for the discovery of truth by rational 
processes. '"229 The foundation of Morgan's reform efforts, then, was not to produce better 
224. In his Hoffman draft, Frank wrote, "[E]veryone who has talked to those who have served on juries 
knows that the evidence often plays but a small role in jurors' deliberations." Hoffman, partial draft opinion, in 
Frank Papers, supra note 110, at Box 61, Folder 631. He cited no empirical data for this claim, instead citing 
Morgan's caustic review of the book Trial Technique by Irving Goldstein. Edmund M. Morgan, Book Review, 
49 HARV. L. REV. 1387 (1936). Goldstein suggested, among other things, that the plaintiffs lawyer in a tort 
case seek jurors who will respond to an emotional appeal. Frank noted that Morgan acknowledged that 
Goldstein's conclusions were the product of real trial work. Frank should have known (and probably did know) 
better than to conclude that one man's experience proved his point. He was trying (not very successfully, in my 
view) to attack Morgan with Morgan's own words. For the same point, using the same example, see FRANK, 
supra note 169, at 121. 
225. Frank may have modified his views on this by the time he wrote Courts on Trial. See FRANK, supra 
note 169, at 123 ("[Exclusionary rules] limit, absurdly, the court-room quest for the truth."); id. at 144 ("[I]fwe 
have to have the jury, let us abolish, or modify, most (not all) of the exclusionary rules, since they often shut 
out important evidence without which the actual past facts cannot be approximated."). This sounds just like 
Morgan. 
226. Hoffman, partial draft opinion, in Frank Papers, supra note 110, at Box 61, Folder 631. 
227. See, e.g., Morgan, Foreword, supra note 54, at 11; FRANK, supra note 169, at 80-102. 
228. See supra note 39. 
229. Hoffman, partial draft opinion, in Frank Papers, supra note 110, at Box 61, Folder 631 (quoting 
Morgan, supra note 224, at 1389 (reviewing IRVING GOLDSTEIN, TRIAL TECHNIQUE ( 1935))). It was this 
statement in the Harvard Law Review which revived the Frank-Morgan correspondence in 1941. Frank wanted 
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factfinding by the jury, but to reduce the waste of time the rules brought to the trial and 
appellate courts. This is not quite accurate. Morgan was well aware that "the jury is often 
swayed by sympathy and prejudice"230 and also was quite well aware of the immense 
difficulty of finding the truth of "what actually happened, in a case where the facts are in 
dispute."231 But he believed a lawsuit could be made a "rational proceeding," and the only 
way in which to do that was to reform the rules of evidence. Frank is more accurate about 
Morgan's belief in "truth." After reading Frank's unpublished essay, Morgan's response 
was not to defend the trial as a search for the truth, but merely to claim that "[t]he less of 
a game you make of a lawsuit, the better job a jury will do. It is nonsense to say that a 
jury cannot with the aid of judges and counsel put a fair value upon hearsay."232 Although 
the probabilities of ascertaining the truth were more likely once evidence reform was in 
place, no guarantees could be made. 
Frank travelled in a different direction. Frank proposed eliminating the jury because 
it was incapable of discovering the "true facts."233 In Courts on Trial, Frank claimed that 
"[ m ]any experienced persons believe that of all the possible ways that could be devised 
to get at the falsity or truth of testimony, none could be conceived that would be more 
ineffective than trial by jury."234 The existence of the jury "helps to keep alive this fight-
theory"235 at the expense of Frank's preferred "truth theory." Frank accepted that the trial 
process, because human, was fallible. Mimicking Morgan, he concluded that the trial 
"can never be a completely scientific investigation for the discovery of the true facts. "236 
But because the goal of the trial was the truth, the judicial process should rely on experts 
to ascertain the truth. Such experts included judges and administrative experts. 237 
to quote this statement in his book If Men Were Angels and wrote "Professor Morgan," asking to publish 
material from an article in Volume 49 of the Harvard Law Review. After some confusion (apparently Morgan 
clearly distinguished "articles" from "book reviews") and after chiding "Jerry" for not calling him "Eddie," 
Morgan granted permission. 
230. Edmund M. Morgan, Book Review, 46 HARV. L. REV. 1203 (1933) (reviewing JOSEPH N. ULMAN, 
A JUDGE TAKES THE STAND (1933)). 
231. Edmund M. Morgan, Book Review, 2 J. LEGAL EDUC. 385, 386 (1950) (reviewing FRANK, supra 
note 169). 
232. Letter from Edmund M. Morgan to Jerome Frank (August 15, 1942) (Frank Papers, supra note 11 0, 
at Box 61, Folder 631; Morgan Papers, supra note 106, at Box 5, Folder 1 0). See also Morgan, Code of 
Evidence, supra note 54, at 539 ("A lawsuit is not a means of making a scientific investigation for the 
ascertainment of truth; it is a proceeding for the orderly settlement of a controversy between litigants."). 
233. For Frank's use of this phrase, see, e.g., Hoffman, 129 F.2d at 996; Zell v. American Seating Co., 
138 F.2d 641, 645 (2d Cir. 1943); and FRANK, supra note 169, at 102. 
234. FRANK, supra note 169, at 20. Included in the "many experienced persons" was Frank himself. 
See FRANK, supra note 169, at 108-25. 
235. FRANK, supra note 169, at 136. 
236. FRANK, supra note 169, at 99. 
237. Hoffman, partial draft opinion, in Frank Papers, supra note 110, at Box 61, Folder 631; FRANK. 
supra note 169, at 126-27. Frank knew eliminating the jury was impossible and suggested jury reforms 
including the use of the special verdict, expert juries in commercial and other complex cases, intermediate fact-
finders, eliminating most exclusionary evidence rules, recording jury-room deliberations, and training for jury 
service, FRANK, supra note 169, at 141-45, as well as "testimonial experts" to give opinions whether the witness 
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This seems a curious conclusion for one who proclaimed he was an "original" 
member of a sub-group of legal realists Frank called "fact-skeptics."238 The difference lay 
in a misunderstanding of the phrase. Frank's self-stylization as a fact-skeptic was not a 
claim that he was a cognitive relativist, for he believed devoutly in "true facts." As often 
as he placed the word facts in quotes, he spoke of getting as close as possible to what 
really happened. As Morgan noted in his review of Frank's book, there was an 
"overemphasis" on the "possibility of mistake and perjury" in litigation.239 Frank's 
"overemphasis" on mistake and perjury was a result of his desire to make the trial a search 
for truth. 
What does Hoffman tell us? In terms of the law of evidence, it tells us that the fear 
of "false" evidence has always been used to caution against efforts proclaiming ''radical 
reform." In terms of the legal thought of Jerome Frank, it suggests a caution to the picture 
of Frank as a "relativist." For all the difficulties in achieving it, the goal of the trial was 
truth, a goal that seems incompatible with the portrait of Frank as a cognitive relativist. 
It also suggests that Frank's reform proposals, based on the idea that truth is the goal of 
the trial, fit squarely within the tradition of evidence reformers like Appleton, Thayer and 
Wigmore. This also suggests that Morgan was more comfortable than Frank in living 
with the uncertainty of the adequacy of the jury's search for the truth. This also makes 
Morgan less a pillar of the legal establishment and more a radical reformer. Finally, it 
suggests a much shallower divide, a "difference in emphasis"240 as Morgan put it, between 
"realists" as exemplified by Frank, and "progressives" as exemplified by Morgan. 
C. The Effect on Hearsay Reform 
One recurrent theme of the work of evidence reformers is optimism that the future 
will bring about a better day. From Thayer's The Present and Future of the Law of 
Evidence241 to McCormick's Tomorrow's Law ofEvidence242 to Morgan's The Future of 
the Law of Evidence, 243 the criticism of the present state of the law was leavened by 
suggestions for its future improvement. Among Thayer, McCormick and Morgan, the last 
was lying, FRANK, supra note 169, at 100. Well before Courts on Trial was published, Morgan voiced his 
skepticism ofthe ability of judges to decide fre~ of sympathy and prejudice. See Morgan, supra note 230, at 
1203 ("To be sure, the jury is often swayed by sympathy and prejudice; but are trial judges motivated solely by 
intellectual impulses?"). 
238. FRANK, supra note 169, at 74. Included in this group as "perhaps" a fact-skeptic was Morgan. 
FRANK, supra note 169, at 74. 
239. Morgan, supra note 231, at 387. Morgan continued: "[T]here is no solid ground for the conclusion 
that the perjured evidence is credited and that the result in the majority of litigated cases is not in accord with 
the essentials of the actual facts." Morgan, supra note 231, at 3 87. Frank did not limit this assertion to his 
books: "Perjury, of course, is pernicious and doubtless much of it is used in our courts daily with unfortunate 
success." Zell v. American Seating Co., 138 F.2d 641,645-46 (2d Cir. 1943). 
240. Letter from Edmund M. Morgan to Jerome Frank (August 11, 1933) (Frank Papers, supra note 11 Q, 
at Box 14, Folder 166; Morgan Papers, supra note 106, at Box 5, Folder 4). 
241. James B. Thayer, The Present and Future of the Law of Evidence, 12 HARV. L. REv. 71 (1898). 
242. Charles T. McCormick, Tomorrow's Law of Evidence, 24 A.B.A. J. 507 (July 1938). On 
McCormick's career, see the tributes found at 28 TEX. L. REv. 3-22 (I 949) and 40 TEX. L. REv. 176-92 (1961). 
243. Edmund M. Morgan, The Future ofthe Law of Evidence, 29 TEX. L. REv. 587 (1951). 
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was the most pessimistic. Although Thayer claimed that the "rules are thus in a great 
degree ill-apprehended, ill-stated, ill-digested,"244 if lawyers and judges kept in mind "a 
few comprehensive, fundamental principles ... , our system might be vastly improved. "245 
McCormick, writing shortly before the ALI began its work on the Model Code, 
concluded: "In actual jury trials the machinery of evidence rules, devised to filter the 
testimony for the untrained minds of the jurymen, has become too complex for use except 
to the limited extent .... "246 But the future held the opportunity for a "rational, simplified 
code of evidence. "247 
After the Model Code failed to be enacted in any state, Morgan was less sanguine. 
After quoting Greenleaf s extravagant praise of the law of evidence248 and summarizing 
the numerous defects of the law of evidence, he wrote: "The picture I have painted is 
dark. To be sure, it is not, on the whole, so black as that which seemed a rosy pink to 
Greenleaf. A lawsuit much more nearly approaches a rational investigation than it did a 
hundred years ago .... But the entire subject needs revision."249 
Of particular concern to Morgan was the lack of progress concerning the application 
of the hearsay rule. He praised Wigmore for bringing "order out of a chaos of 
decisions"250 concerning hearsay but believed that this order created the appearance of "a 
consistency and rationality which I believe non-existent."251 This appearance led the bar 
to accept the hearsay rules as the "'crystalized wisdom of the ages,'" a perception that led 
to opposition to any reform. 252 After applying a number of hearsay rules in a hypothetical 
(but not farfetched) case, Morgan concluded: 
I submit that the combination of these rulings makes a demonstration that the 
hearsay nile as applied is not only illogical but absolutely irrational. It cries 
aloud for reexamination not only of its details but of its justification for 
existence. Its progress in the last century has been not forward but backward, 
and on the road to irrational nonsense. 253 
244. Thayer, supra note 241, at 74. 
245. Thayer, supra note 241, at 72, 93-94. 
246. McCormick, supra note 242, at 508. 
247. McCormick, supra note 242, at 581. McCormick believed that hearsay was one doctrinal area in 
which optimism was warranted. He approvingly cited the Massachusetts rule admitting hearsay declarations 
of persons deceased at the time of trial and saw a future in which the rule would be treated "in terms of 
discretion which needs only to be limited by some requirement of fair notice and to be guided by a general 
standard." McCormick, supra note 242, at 512. 
248. See Morgan, supra note 243, at 587. In 1898, Thayer also quoted Greenleaf and then wrote: "I 
think that it would be juster and more exact to say that our law of evidence is a piece of illogical, but by no 
means irrational, patchwork, not at all to be admired, nor easily to be found intelligible, except as a product of 
the jury system .... " Thayer, supra note 241, at 72. 
249. Morgan, supra note 243, at 598. 
250. Morgan, supra note 243, at 593. 
251. Morgan, supra note 243, at 593-94. 
252. Morgan, supra note 243, at 594. 
253. Morgan, supra note 243, at 597. 
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But there was hope on the horizon. If "a frontal attack on the entire field is foredoomed 
to failure at present,"254 a flank attack, lessening the "sporting features of a lawsuit,"255 
was much more likely to succeed. 
Nearly a decade after the decision in Hoffman, a Kansas City lawyer and Chairman 
of the Evidence Code Committee of the Missouri Bar, Charles L. Carr, discussed the 
proposed Missouri Code of Evidence. 256 By this time, the Model Code of Evidence was 
a dead letter, killed by, among other causes, World War II, Wigmore's opposition/57 and 
professional resistance to "radical" reform. 258 That resistance was due, in some part, to 
the Model Code's "radical reform" of hearsay was made clear in Carr's essay. Carr 
couched the proposed Missouri Evidence Code, also never enacted, as not embracing 
reform, much less radical reform, but as an effort to "clarifly ], condense[], and simplifly ]" 
the existing rules of evidence. 259 The Model Code was "too radical for adoption as a 
whole in Missouri,"260 and "[t]he most revolutionary part of the Model Code" was its 
work concerning hearsay.261 The hearsay rules proposed by the Model Code departed 
from (or ignored) experience, and left the administration of justice "without any real 
limitation or safeguard with regard to hearsay evidence."262 
Morgan's efforts to radically reform the rules of evidence failed, although two later, 
much less radical, efforts generated some reform. 263 Any momentum to radically reform 
hearsay, however, was lost. The Uniform Rules of Evidence were consciously less 
"radical" than the Model Code. According to its Committee Chairman, Spencer Gard, 
"Sensible change without shock is an underlying policy of the Rules. That is the reason 
254. Morgan, supra note 243, at 599. 
255. Morgan, supra note 243, at 605. 
256. Charles L. Carr, The Proposed Missouri Evidence Code, 29 TEX. L. REV. 627 ( 1951 ). This article 
originally was presented at the Benjamin Dudley Tarlton Institute on the Law of Evidence at the University of 
Texas on December 9, 1950. 
257. See John Henry Wigmore, The American Law Institute Code of Evidence Rules: A Dissent, 28 
A.B.A. J. 23 (1942). 
258. See Report of Committee on Administration of Justice on Model Code of Evidence, 19 J. ST. B. 
CALIF. 262 (1944) (rejecting Model Code because it was designed to "entirely revolutionize our present rules 
of evidence and to substitute for them the rules of evidence that are generally in force in continental Europe~'). 
This resistance was also based, in part, on Morgan's controversial claim that, "A lawsuit is not a means of 
making a scientific investigation for the ascertainment of truth." Morgan, Code of Evidence, supra note 54, at 
539. See Ariens, supra note 12, at 234-37, 242-45. 
259. Carr, supra note 256, at 635. 
260. Carr, supra note 256, at 641. 
261. Carr, supra note 256, at 640. See also Carr, supra note 256, at 638 ("The most revolutionary feature 
of the Model Code is that it does away with the hearsay exclusion rule and its exceptions ... without any real 
limitation."). 
262. Carr, supra note 256, at 640. 
263. The Uniform Rules of Evidence, promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws in 1953, were adopted in four jurisdictions, Kansas, New Jersey, Utah and the Virgin 
Islands. The Federal Rules of Evidence, enacted by Congress and implemented in 1975, have been adapted by 
nearly forty states. On the background ofboth sets of rules, see Ariens, supra note 12, at 245-53. 
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why the Rules take a somewhat conservative approach to the problem ofhearsay."264 The 
Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules of Evidence also rejected any radical reform of 
the rules concerning hearsay. As for the 1898 Massachusetts law admitting the hearsay 
declarations of persons deceased at the time of trial, the Committee concluded that was 
"unconvinced of the wisdom of abandoning the traditional requirement of some particular 
assurance of credibility as a condition precedent to admitting the hearsay declaration of 
an unavailable declarant. "265 The modest goal of the Advisory Committee was to 
"encourage growth and development in this area of the law, while conserving the values 
and experience of the past as a guide to the future. "266 The result, depending on how you 
want to count, is between twenty-eight and thirty-seven "exceptions" to the rules on 
hearsay. 267 
Included as one of those exceptions was an exception for business records.268 The 
Advisory Committee explicitly took issue with Frank's conclusion that the exception 
implicitly required the absence of a motive to misrepresent. It concluded that "absence 
of motive to misrepresent has not traditionally been a requirement of the rule; that records 
might be self-serving has not been a ground for exclusion."269 But the rule itself 
capitulated to the long extant fear of false evidence. As drafted and as enacted, the Rule 
permitted exclusion if "the source of information or the tnethod or circumstances of 
preparation indicate lack oftrustworthiness."270 In the early twentieth century, Wigmore 
had tried to make the subject of hearsay cohere by "discover[ing] in each of the 
exceptions something which he calls a guaranty of trustworthiness," an effort Morgan 
believed disastrously wrong. 271 A circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness amounted 
to "nothing more than a situation in which the ordinary person in making the declaration 
would usually desire to tell the truth or would have no motive to falsifY."272 But the 
danger of insincerity was only one of three important hearsay dangers, and the least 
important. Most importantly, trustworthiness was not guaranteed simply because the 
declarant had no motive to falsify; determining trustworthiness required an assessment of 
the declarant's perception and memory, and Wigmore's unified theory of hearsay 
264. Spencer Gard, The Uniform Rules of Evidence, 31 TULANE L. REV. 19, 23 (1956). 
265. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence 
for the United States District Courts and Magistrates, March 1969, 46 F.R.D. 161, 326 (1969) [hereinafter 
Proposed Rules]. The Committee was thus rejecting a proposal advocated at one time or another by John 
Appleton, James Bradley Thayer, John Henry Wigmore (in the Commonwealth Fund proposal), Eddie Morgan, 
John M. Maguire, and Charles T. McCormick. 
266. !d. at 328. 
267. There are twenty-four exceptions to the hearsay rule in Fed. R. Evid. 803 and five exceptions in 
Fed. R. Evid. 804. Because one exception is duplicated in Rules 803 and 804, one can count a minimum of 
twenty-eight exceptions. If you count, in addition to all of the exceptions in Rules 803 and 804, the 
"exceptions" (the Federal Rules simply define them as not hearsay) found in Fed. R. Evid. 801 (d), you reach 
thirty-seven exceptions. 
268. FED. R. EVID. 803(6). 
269. Proposed Rules, supra note 265, at 360-61 (citation omitted). 
270. Proposed Rules, supra note 265, at 346; FED. R. Evm. 803(6). 
271 . Morgan, Code of Evidence, supra note 54, at 694. 
272. Morgan, Code of Evidence, supra note 54, at 694 (emphasis added). 
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exceptions failed by emphasizing the element of sincerity at the expense of perception and 
memory. 273 Morgan believed Wigmore's effort to find a guarantee of trustworthiness in 
each recognized exception to hearsay was undertaken in the fallacious belief that the 
cause for the rules of hearsay, and more generally, the exclusionary rules of evidence, was 
the existence of the jury.274 For all its talk about the historical derivation of the rule, the 
Advisory Committee's inclusion in Rule 803(6) of the "trustworthiness" guarantee 
element accepted Frank's view that the jury could not be trusted to assess evidence in 
which there was some motive to falsify. Thus was reform strangled. 
CONCLUSION 
Thayer's desire for a "system of evidence simple, aiming straight at the substance of 
justice, not nice or refined in a its details, not too rigid, easily grasped and easily applied 
simple rules"275 is no closer to us than it was to lawyers practicing in Thayer's day. It 
may be that such rules are beyond the law of evidence, particularly in an age in which 
insights from economics, game theory, probability theory and communication theory are 
suggested for the reform of hearsay and other aspects of the law of evidence. We may do 
no better than Learned Hand: "The truth is that no rules in the end will help us. "276 
To end as I began, I quote Judge Abruzzo, in his instructions to the jury in Hoffman 
v. Palmer. After summarizing the testimony of the parties, Abruzzo concluded: "Those 
are the stories, gentlemen. Both of them can't be true, can they? Either one of the stories 
must be true, and the other one not. It will become your duty to reconcile the testimony, 
to analyze it, and put your fingers on where the truth is. "277 
273. Morgan, Code of Evidence, supra note 54, at 694. 
274. Morgan, Code of Evidence, supra note 54, at 694. See also Morgan, supra note 222; Edmund M. 
Morgan, The Hearsay Rule, 12 WASH. L. REv. 1, 1, 11-19 (1937). 
275. THAYER, supra note 30, at 529. Both McCormick and Morgan also wished for simple, 
understandable rules of evidence. See McCormick, supra note 242, at 581 ("The final yield will be the 
acceptance by national and state courts of the task of embodying in rules of court a rational, simplified code of 
evidence."); Morgan, supra note 243, at 609 (suggesting the drafting of evidence rules like the "harmonious, 
simple and easy of application" rules of civil procedure). 
276. Learned Hand, The Deficiencies of Trials to Reach the Heart of the Matter, in 3 LECTURES ON 
LEGAL TOPICS 87, 104 ( 1926) (published address given on November 17, 1921, by Hand, then a United States 
District Judge). 
277. Record, supra note 59, at 424. 
